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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY THORSEN, 
REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CASE NO. 880402 
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., 
Defendants. Category No. 14b 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thorsen had the right to maintain his easement in its 
historical size and condition. Thus, a critical issue which must 
be resolved prior to a measure of damages, if any are owed to 
respondents (hereinafter referred to as Gooseberry), is a 
determination of the size and extent of the easement which 
existed prior to any damage to Gooseberry's property. The damage 
suffered by the respondents is limited to the impact on the 
property resulting from the enlargement of the easement as 
opposed to the original easement itself. 
The size or capacity of the original easement was never 
addressed by Gooseberry at trial, in their motion to reassess 
damages, or in their brief which is submitted for purposes of 
this appeal. 
This Court, however, in Thorsen I stated: 
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed because it was 
based on his assumption that no one had a lawful 
irrigation ditch easement through the "lots." This 
was erroneous. As previously mentioned, at oral 
argument of this case before this Court, counsel for 
Gooseberry Estates admitted that the trial court did 
not find an abandonment and that Thorsen had an 
easement for the irrigation ditch. 
Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 P 2d 1243, 1246 (Utah 1947) (attached as 
Addendum "E"). 
The evidence presented at trial is abundant in 
demonstrating both the existence of the easement and the 
historical size of the lower "B" ditch. This sets the point for 
comparison and upon comparison it becomes evident that Gooseberry 
suffered minor damage at best. 
POINT I 
BEFORE ANY APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAN BE DETERMINED 
THE SIZE AND EXTENT OF THE ORIGINAL EASEMENT ACROSS GOOSEBERRY'S 
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF THORSEN MUST BE ASCERTAINED. 
The Iowa Supreme Court in Nixon v. Welch, 24 NW 2d 146 
(Iowa, 1946) (attached as Addendum "A") rendered a decision which 
is widely accepted and often quoted as authority for the extent 
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of easements relating specifically to the rights and duties of 
owners of water rights. 
The Court discussed the rights a dominant estate has to 
enter upon the servient estate to maintain and clean a waterway 
easement such as a ditch. In quoting from Roberts v. Roberts, 
55 NY 275, the Court stated: 
If the ditch got out of repair by reason of floods or 
washing away its banks or otherwise, it was the legal 
right of the plaintiff to repair it so as to restore 
it to its original condition and make it subserve the 
purpose which it originally effected, of carrying off 
water of the stream. He was entitled to have the 
ditch kept up as it was when he purchased, and to 
keep it in that condition, and if necessary, to enter 
upon the defendant's lands to make repairs, doing no 
unnecessary injury. (Emphasis added) 
Nixon at 1145. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Holm v. Davis, 125 P 403 (Utah, 1912) 
(attached as Addendum "B") quotes from Jones on easements: 
The owner of a dominant estate having an easement 
has a right to enter upon the servient estate and 
make repairs necessary for the reasonable and 
convenient use of the easement, doing no 
unnecessary injury to the servient estate. 
The Court in Nixon also stated: 
To illustrate: "A person having an easement in a 
ditch running through the land of another may go upon 
the servient land and use so much thereof on either 
side of the ditch as may be required to make all 
necessary repairs and to clean out the ditch at all 
reasonable times; he is liable only for the abuse of 
this right. It has also been held that the right of 
access is not limited to purposes of repairs, but may 
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be exercised to make original constructions necessary 
for the enjoyment of the easement. 
Nixon at 1146. 
The standard applied pursuant to the authority cited supra, 
is that the size of the easement granted to Thorsen should be 
sufficient "to subserve the purpose which it originally effected 
of carrying off the water of the stream". 
Harry Thorsen was secretary and treasurer of Gooseberry 
Creek Irrigation Company at the time of the cleaning of the ditch 
and had held the position of secretary/treasurer for some 15 to 
20 years prior to the cleaning of the ditch. (Transcript page 
455). Gooseberry Creek Irrigation Company is entitled, according 
to the Cox Decree, to a maximum of 26 and 45/100 second feet of 
water and is entitled to a minimum of 17 second feet out of 
Gooseberry Creek (Transcript page 458). The Gooseberry Creek 
irrigation system is divided into an "A" ditch section, a "B" 
ditch section and a "C" ditch section. (Transcript page 458). At 
those times of the year when the flow of the river is at its 
maximum the water is split evenly to each of the three sections, 
thus, one-third of the 26 and 45/100 second feet, or eight to 
nine second feet of water, would be sent down the "B" ditch 
section. (Transcript Page 459). At the time of the cleaning of 
the ditch which Gooseberry asserts increased the size of the 
easement and thereby gave rise to these proceedings, the "B" 
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ditch section came down a single ditch and at a point was 
diverted between what has been referred to as the upper "B" ditch 
or the "B" ditch extension and the lower "B" ditch which is the 
ditch of concern in this litigation. 
POINT II 
THE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL ESTABLISHES THE HISTORICAL CAPACITY 
AND DIMENSIONS OF THE LOWER "B" DITCH AS HAVING AND 
CARRYING CAPACITY OF SEVEN TO TEN SECOND FEET OF WATER 
AND BEING THREE FEET WIDE. 
Allen K. Nielson. Allen K. Nielson, a consulting engineer 
for which Gooseberry stipulated was a licensed engineer and an 
expert witness in the field testified: 
Q: Allen, have you had occasion to inspect the soil 
conservation records concerning what has been 
referred to in this litigation as the lower "B" ditch 
on the Johnson property at Gooseberry? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: When did you do that? 
A: This morning. 
Q: And what did those records show with regard to 
the history of the lower -- what we call the lower 
ditch? 
A: Well, it shows that originally being the 
Gooseberry water user's canal and, as far as the 
record showed, it has never been abandoned. 
(Transcript page 450). 
Ted Bird. Ted Bird's family owned the property which is 
currently owned by Gooseberry Estates. The Birds resided on the 
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Gooseberry property until 1937 at which time Ted Bird's family 
sold the property. Mr. Bird was born in 1911. He recalls going 
to the lower "B" ditch as a boy and also Mr. Bird testified that 
from 1930 until 1937 he had the duty of irrigating the 
Gooseberry property. 
When asked about the size and capacity of the ditch prior to 
the time they sold the property in 1937, Ted Bird testified: 
Q: How wide? 
A: Well, I would say that it was right around three 
foot wide, but that at that time it wasn't too deep. 
Q: How deep? 
A: Well, I would say it wasn't over one foot. I use 
to take a little dipper to get a gallon, to dip it 
out, to get a gallon of water. 
Q: O.k. 
A: And that went along as long as until the folks 
moved away from Gooseberry. 
Q: Now, how much water would you up to the time 
your folks moved away, how much water would you put 
down the lower "B" ditch. 
A: We put it all. 
Q: And what do you mean by "all". 
A: Well, we put all of Gooseberry Creek. 
. . . 
A: Well, I think in the Spring of the year you 
could turn ten feet of water in there. 
(Transcript, page 548). 
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Harry Thorsen, In 1944, Harry Thorsen acquired the property 
which he currently owns and which was irrigated by the lower "B" 
ditch. (Transcript, page 456). At the time Mr. Thorsen acquired 
the property he purchased 14 shares of water in the lower "B" 
ditch and five shares of water in the upper "B" ditch. 
(Transcript, page 457). 
As to the amount of water which was sent down the lower "B" 
ditch historically, Harry Thorsen testified: 
Q: Assuming that a normal average year, what would 
be the most water you could take down the lower "B" 
ditch in the high season. 
A: In the high season? 
Q: Yes. 
A: Well, in the earlier days, we would take out six 
or seven feet down there. (Transcript, page 461). 
Mr. Thorsen testified that from the year he purchased the 
property up until 1978 when the property was leased to Clayton 
Crane, the lower "B" ditch was used every year: 
Q: From 1944 to 1978 when you leased the property to 
Clayton Crane, was there any year that you didn't use 
the lower "B" ditch. 
A: Oh, no. We always used it. (Transcript, page 
462). 
Eric Allen Thorsen. Allen Thorsen is the son of Harry 
Thorsen who testified that prior to his graduation from high 
school in 1959, that he assisted his father on the ranch and 
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recalled several of the structures, including the flume in the 
ditch and also recalls helping his father take water down the 
lower "B" ditch. (Transcript, pages 502 to 504). 
In 1967, Allen Thorsen moved back to the ranch and assisted 
his father in the actual ranching and irrigation of the property 
full time until 1972. Since 1972, Allen Thorsen has been on the 
property on several occasions. He testified that there was water 
in the ditch each year between 1967 and 1972 and even beyond that 
time when he was on the property. (Transcript, page 504). 
When questioned about the historical dimension of the ditch, 
Allen Thorsen testified as follows: 
Q: How would you describe the ditch back in those 
early years with respect to size and its appearance? 
A: I would say three feet wide and at least a couple 
of feet deep on an average. (Transcript, page 504). 
Bob Robbins. Bob Robbins was an individual who leased 
the Gooseberry property on which the lower "B" ditch and the 
easement is located during the years 1974 through 1978. 
Q: Did you see water running through that ditch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All the way? 
A: Yes. 
Q: To the Thorsen property? 
A: Yes. 
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A: . . . 1 made a shutter out of one solid piece of 
metal with a handle on it, and when I put that down 
in front of that pipe, I took the whole creek, all 
the water. 
Q: Down the lower "B" ditch? 
A: Down the lower "B" ditch? 
Q: And how much would that be? . . . 
A: I'm sure we would have to have over ten feet. . . 
Transcript, pages 515 - 517. 
CIayton Crane. Clayton Crane was the individual who leased 
the Thorsen property subsequent to 1978. Clayton testified that 
he used the ditch in the Spring of 1978 and water was brought to 
the Thorsen property through the lower "B" ditch in 1978. 
(Transcript, page 422). He said that due to the forces of nature 
it was so difficult to bring the ditch down the lower "B" ditch 
that the ditch would need to be cleaned prior to further use. 
(Transcript, page 423). 
POINT III 
THE IMPROVEMENTS LOCATED IN THE DITCH ITSELF EVIDENCE 
THE HISTORICAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE DITCH AS 
SEVEN TO TEN SECOND FEET AND THE WIDTH AS THREE FEET. 
Two engineers testified on behalf of Thorsen relating to the 
improvements located in the lower "B,f ditch and the amount of 
water which could be carried through each of the structures. 
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Paul Landell testified that structure number one would carry 
11.6 cubic feet per second, structure number two would carry ten 
cubic feet per second and that structure three would carry 7.1 
cubic feet per second. (Transcript, pages 390 to 391). 
Allen Nelson, who Gooseberry stipulated was a licensed 
engineer and an expert witness, testified that he also measured 
the first two structures in the lower "B" ditch and testified 
that the carrying capacity of both structures exceeded 11 cubic 
feet per second. (Transcript, pages 451 to 452). 
The testimony given at trial establishes that the historical 
carrying capacity of the ditch was between seven to ten cubic 
feet of water. As it relates to the actual dimensions of the 
ditch itself, the testimony is consistent that the ditch itself 
encompassed at least three feet in width. 
POINT IV 
THORSEN HAS USED EQUIPMENT ON THE DITCH TO MAINTAIN AND 
REPAIR IT ON AN ALMOST ANNUAL BASIS AND IN DOING SO 
HAS MAINTAINED THE DITCH WITH DIMENSIONS OF MORE THAN 
THREE FEET IN WIDTH AND TWO AND ONE-HALF FEET IN DEPTH. 
Harry Thorsen, Allen Thorsen, and Ted Bird, all testified 
that on almost an annual basis, both the south and north end of 
the lower "B" ditch were cleaned and maintained by the use of a 
piece of equipment called a "V". 
A: . . .We've got two "V", one is a big one and one 
is a little one. 
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Q: Would you describe each of them? 
A: Yes. I measured them here the other day because 
we've still got those ditchers and the large one is 
67" wide and six feet long. The smaller one is 41" 
wide and it is six feet long and we would put these 
on a tractor and drag them behind a tractor. Usually 
it would take several passes. 
Well, we would use the ditchers where the ditch 
silted up and the two places that would give us any 
problem would be the upper part and lower part of the 
ditch. That is where the silt seemed to go. We 
would get a flood down Coal Canyon or somewhere and 
we would find the ditch was filling up and would have 
to work on it a little and we would make several 
passes, and, when we would go up there, why we'd have 
this case 530 and put the big ditcher on that 
tractor and then we'd go through it and stand the 
ditcher right up on its nose, and go through and 
start, and then we'd make two or three passes, and we 
would lower the ditcher down and widen the ditch out 
with the ditcher on each sequential pass that we 
would make. 
Q: And what depth and width would you get in that 
process? 
A: I would say we would go at least two and one-half 
feet and maybe better than three feet wide. 
(Emphasis added). 
Q: And how far to the side would you throw dirt? 
A: I don't know, it's hard to say. Maybe a couple 
feet, three feet maybe. 
Transcript, Pages 506 and 507. (See also Transcript page 467 and 
also Transcript page 554). 
The purpose for which the easement was originally 
established was for the carrying of water with a maximum of seven 
to ten cubic feet per second and that historically the dimensions 
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of the ditch were three feet wide and one to two and one-half 
feet deep. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Holm v. Davis, 125 P 403 (Utah 
1912), dealt with an easement by which water was taken to the 
Davis property through a ditch over Holm's property. Like the 
case at hand, the easement in Holm v. Davis was established long 
before Holm and Davis acquired their property rights. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Holm stated: 
The fact, therefore, that the canal was on the land 
and was being used for the purposes aforesaid was 
notice to the respondent that it was a structure of a 
permanent character used for purposes permanent in 
their nature, and hence he purchased the land subject 
to the rights of the owner of the canal. If the 
right to use the same, therefore, had ripened into a 
prescriptive right by the lapse of time and the 
character of its use, respondent purchased and holds 
the land subject to appellant's right to maintain and 
use the canal for the purposes for which it was 
constructed, maintained and used from its inception. 
(Emphasis added). 
Holm at page 406. 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to say: 
« . . We are of the opinion, that, although a canal, 
ditch or flume may have been constructed by a person 
on or over lands owned by another with the consent or 
permission of each such other owner, yet if the owner 
of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his assignee, has 
used and maintained the same in the same manner as if 
they same were constructed over his own lands, and 
where such use and maintenance has continued 
uninterruptedly, and under a claim of right for more 
than twenty years, in such event, the owner of the 
ditch has acquired a right to use and maintain the 
same perpetually as an easement. 
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Holm at 406 to 407. 
POINT V 
THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT AS AN INCIDENT 
TO THE REASONABLE ENJOYMENT OF AN EASEMENT IN A DITCH THAT 
THERE IS ASSUMED A SUFFICIENT DISTANCE ON EACH SIDE OF THE 
DITCH FOR BANKS AND FURTHER, THAT AN ADEQUATE DISTANCE IS 
ALLOWED FOR ACCESS AND MAINTENANCE BEYOND THE THREE FOOT WIDTH. 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Northern Division, in United States v. 3.08 Acres of Land, Etc., 
209 F. Supp. 652 (Utah, N.D. 1962) (attached as Addendum "C"), 
resolved a dispute between the United States of America and Utah 
Power & Light Company over certain property rights and easement 
rights relating to the Willard Canal, Weber Basin project, Utah. 
The Court determined that in order for one to enjoy the full and 
proper rights granted under an easement that an easement for a 
canal or a ditch would also include banks along the side of the 
water way and access for purposes of maintenance: 
I think it is a matter of common knowledge of which 
the court may take judicial notice that canals in 
addition to bottoms and sides frequently, if not 
invariably, have banks. It is reasonable to suppose 
that the legislature in making provision for 
reservation of rights of way for canals contemplated 
that easements so reserved would be for the purpose 
of constructing and maintaining banks of canals among 
other things. In this mountainous region where 
hydrolic gradient must be maintained over irregular 
terrain it may not be supposed that the maintenance 
of canals without banks necessarily was contemplated. 
On the contrary, not only may banks of some sort be 
deemed reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the 
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easement reserved in favor of the government, but we 
must accept them as within the contemplation of the 
statutes reserving the easement. 
U.S. at 657. 
The Supreme Court of Montana stated in Laden et al. v. 
Atkeson, 116 P 2d 881 (Mont. 1941) (attached as Addendum "D") 
that as part of an easement there also exists a secondary 
easement which allows one sufficient area on each side of a 
ditch or waterway to establish access to the waterway and to 
maintain the easement: 
The right to enter upon the servant tenement for the 
purpose of repairing or renewing an artificial 
structure, constituting an easement, is called a 
"secondary easement". A mere incident of the 
easement that passes by express or implied grant, or 
is acquired by prescription. 2 Thompson on Real 
Property, page 343; 19 C.J. Section 208, page 970; 26 
Cal. Jar. Page 163 and Jones on Easements Section 811 
and 812, pages 653, 654. To illustrate: "A person 
having an easement in a ditch running through the 
land of another may go upon the servient land and use 
so much thereof on either side of the ditch as may be 
required to make all necessary repairs and to clean 
out the ditch at all reasonable times. (Emphasis 
added). 17 Am. Jur. Section 108, page 
1004; Dahlberg v. Lannen, supra, Felsental v. 
Warring, 40 Cal. App. 119, 180, page 67. (Emphasis 
added). 
Laden at page 883. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS REASONABLE FOR TH0RSENS TO EMPLOY THE USE OF A 
BACK HOE TO MAINTAIN THE LOWER "B" DITCH. 
The trial court found that at most Thorsen had the right to 
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run a plow across the Gooseberry property or to hand clean the 
ditch. 
The fact that the easement was originally hand dug does not 
preclude the use of modern equipment for the maintenance and 
repair but on the contrary, it is contemplated that as a incident 
to the easement itself, that modern technology will assist in the 
maintenance and repair of ditches and that said equipment would 
be so employed. 
Beginning in the year 1957, back hoes were implemented as 
the primary equipment used for the repair and maintenance of the 
"A", MB" , and "C" ditches in the Gooseberry irrigation system. 
The United States District Court in United States v. 3.08 
Acres of Land, Etc., cited as supra, held: 
The preponderance of the evidence, however, 
indicates, and I find, that upon the basis of 
equipment in existence, the only practical way that 
the canal can be cleaned at present, and certainly 
the normal and reasonable means under current 
conditions, is to utilize a 50 foot boom with drag 
line, the banks of the canal at the water line being 
some 70 to 90 feet apart, and at being impracticable 
because of the construction of the canal and the 
necessity of maintaining water in it almost all the 
time to move equipment into the bottom. 
It must be acknowledged that at the time of the 
original reservation, such equipment as a 50 foot 
boom and drag line for purposes of cleaning canals 
was not a usual thing, and may not have even been in 
use at all. Such an operation was not one that 
could be deemed uncontemplated in principle. As a 
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matter of fact, a 100 foot canal probably was not 
ordinary construction in those days. 
The right reasonably to maintain such a canal, 
including the right to operate the 50 foot boom, if 
reasonably necessary under existing conditions, must 
be considered to be included in the reserved 
easement. The general rule is that while an easement 
holder may not increase a servitude upon the 
grantor's property by enlarging on the easement 
itself, it is entitled to do what is reasonably 
necessary for full and proper enjoyment of the rights 
granted under the easement in the normal development 
of the use of the dominant tenement. (Citations 
omitted). (Emphasis added). 
United States at 658 to 659. 
POINT VII 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIZE AND CAPACITY OF THE LOWER "B" 
DITCH AFTER THE REPAIR AND THE SIZE AND THE CAPACITY 
OF THE EASEMENT HISTORICALLY IS AT BEST MINIMAL. 
Tim Jones was called as an expert by respondents Gooseberry 
Estates. Gooseberry established his qualifications as having a 
Master's Degree in civil engineering from Brigham Young 
Engineering and specializes in municipal water, sewer, 
irrigation, and other water related engineering. (Transcript, 
page 187). In response to the specific question from counsel for 
Gooseberry Estates as to the capacity of the newly repaired 
ditch, he testified: 
Answer: Well, again, if I may, you have flat 
sections of it that would be limited and eventually 
will silt in and you won't have very much capacity 
and then you have the steeper, in the steep sections, 
that you could perceive would carry ten second feet 
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of water quite easily and in the flat section where 
it silts in - - (Emphasis added). 
Question: You could clean those out and still carry 
it wouldn't you? 
Answer: Yes, I mean, that would be a maintenance 
thing. 
Transcript, page 212. 
Paul E. Landell, who was also called as an expert at trial, 
testified that he walked the length of the excavation on the 
lower "B" ditch (Transcript, page 395) and offered testimony at 
trial as to the contours of the property and the size of the 
ditch after the repair and maintenance took place: 
Q: What did you observe concerning the nature of the 
back hoe work on the ditch? 
A: Well, one of the things that impressed me is 
that it must have been — it's a very difficult area 
to work because there is a considerable amount of 
cross flow and it was under those circumstances, it 
was very difficult to operate a piece of equipment. 
A back hoe would be virtually the logical piece of 
equipment to use on that, when they started the work. 
The upstream of the gate on the north end of the 
Johnson property, there were indications of — well, 
there was a ditch which had not been excavated and 
shortly they got into the excavated area which came 
all the way to about the edge of the wooded area, 
going in a southerly direction and the ditch itself, 
where it ran through there, that I walked through, 
was of not a continuous straight gradient, it was 
inground, which is rather difficult to work with, 
but, as I said, it's got a lot of erratic, a lot of 
boulders in it, and it had an average capacity of, I 
would say, or an average end area, which would be 
useful for carrying water. And now, this is not 
consistent through the whole thing, but I would say 
an average of about three feet in width by one and 
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o n e - h a l f f e e t i n d e p t h * ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 
(Transcript , page 396 - 397) . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , the d i tch had a width of three f e e t or more and a 
depth of between one foot and two and one-half f e e t . The 
excavation the respondents claim damaged them was, i n a c t u a l i t y , 
c o n s i s t e n t with the h i s t o r i c a l s i z e of the d i t c h . 
POINT VIII 
ON REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES THE COURT MUST RULE IN LIGHT 
OF THE ENTIRE RECORD BEFORE IT. 
Counsel for Gooseberry argues in their responsive brief that 
the Affidavits of Bruce D. Whitehead and Ken Esplin were 
uncontradicted on the Motion for Reassessment of Damages. On the 
contrary, the trial court must make its decision based upon the 
entire record which includes not only the testimony offered at 
trial and the affidavits but the instructions contained in the 
opinion from this Court. 
Ken Esplin's Affidavit cannot be the sole basis for 
measuring damages because several contradictory opinions remain 
unreconciled in the lower court's holding on reassessment of 
damages. This Court stated on the first appeal: 
Esplinfs appraisal was also flawed because it was 
based on his assumption that no one had a lawful 
irrigation ditch easement through the lots. This was 
erroneous. 
Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 P 2d 1243, 1246 (Utah 1947) (attached as 
Addendum "E" ). 
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The Affidavit submitted by Ken Esplin on reassessment of 
damages and considered at length in respondent's brief again 
fails to address the issue of the size of the existing easement 
nor does it consider what effect the historical size of easement 
would have on the measure of damages. The trial court also 
neglects to make any findings or address the impact the extent of 
the existing easement would have on determining the damages 
awarded by the Court. 
All of the record must be considered on reassessment of 
damages. 
At trial, Ken Esplin testified that there were ten lots 
which were damaged, by 50% of their value. The trial court 
accepted the opinion of Ken Esplin at the time of trial with the 
exception that the court specifically found nine lots damaged as 
opposed to ten. The Affidavits of Bruce Whitehead and Ken Esplin 
do not offer additional information which would warrant expanding 
the damage beyond the nine lots previously found by the Court. 
To expand the damages outside the nine lots, the Court would have 
to use Ken Esplin's Affidavit to impeach Esplin's own testimony 
at trial. 
Further, at trial, Ken Esplin testified that the diminution 
in market value of the ten lots to which he assigned some degree 
of damage was a decrease of 50% of their value. In Ken Esplinfs 
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Affidavit on reassessment of damages, he testifies that the 
diminution of value is the difference between $1,250.00 as the 
proposed value of the property and that the only other use is for 
grazing purposes valued at $100.00 per acre. No explanation is 
ever given or reconciliation made why 50% diminution in value as 
previously testified to should now be changed to nearly a 100% 
diminution. 
The Court's determination that damage existed outside of the 
nine lots previously found by the same Court to be damaged is 
wholly without foundation in the evidence presented to the Court 
by either the Affidavits or otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court determined on the first appeal that an easement 
existed in favor of Thorsen for a ditch across the Gooseberry 
property. In measuring the damages one must initially make a 
determination of the nature and extent of that property right 
since Thorsen is liable only for exceeding his property right in 
the easement. 
The proper determination of the size and extent of the 
easement is not the size of the easement after the forces of 
nature have obstructed and inhibited the water way, but rather, 
the size of the easement should be determined in light of the 
purposes for which the easement was originally established. The 
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record abundantly sets out the size and capacity of the ditch for 
the period of 1930 through the time of the cleaning of the ditch 
as seven to ten second feet and three feet wide. Thorsen is 
only liable for damages created because he abused or exceeded his 
property right. 
The damage in this case might be a combination of the amount 
of property, if any, taken by the enlarged easement or specific 
and the aesthetic effect, if any, the enlarged easement has on 
the value of the property. This Court was correct in directing 
the assessment of damages only based on the property actually 
taken since the difference between the historical capacity and 
size of the ditch and the capacity and size of the repaired ditch 
is so small that it does not have much visual impact, if any. 
In other words, the issue is not the measure of damages 
resulting from the existence of the ditch itself on the 
Gooseberry property, since that right always existed, but rather, 
the appropriate measure is for only that portion of the 
excavation which exceeded Thorsen's lawful property interest. 
As one reviews the testimony and evidence presented, it is 
evident that Thorsen did not greatly exceed his right to repair 
and maintain the lower "B" ditch and therefore, appellant 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the 
trial court and direct the award of minimal damages, if any, to 
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respondent. 
DATED this 26th day of May,/ 1989. 
FREDERICK A.\ 0IACKMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
NIXON v. WELCH H41 
<— Iowa —, 169 ALU 1141. 24 NWM 476) 
CHESTER A. NIXON et a!., Appts., 
v. 
VKIiNA li. W K U J I v.i ttl 
Iowa Supreme Court — October 15, 1946 
( _ Iowa —, 169 ALR 1141, 24 NW2d 476) 
Easements, § 54 — repair — artificial drainage ditch. 
1. The owner of the servient estate over whose land an easement exists 
in a watercourse, in favor of the owner of the dominant estate, must permit 
cleaning out of the watercourse across his land. 
[See annotation on this question beginning on page 1117.] 
Easements, § 54 — repair — artificial drainage ditch — duty of dominant 
owner — cost. 
2. The owner of an easement in an artificial drainage ditch across land 
of another for the discharge of surface waters from his dominant land, if 
the only party benefited thereby, has the duty of keeping the easement in 
repair and must bear the entire cost of cleaning out and reopening the 
ditch when it becomes filled in by natural causes. 
[See annotation on this question beginning on page 1147.] 
Waters, §§60, 61 — surface waters 
— drainage of — establishment 
of drainage district. 
3. An owner of land within an es-
tablished drainage district who can 
show that a part of his land is not 
in fact drained by the established 
ditch, but constitutes a dominant 
tract drained by another natural or 
lMMir-PQl«h!io|ipil iirlififijil wMl«»rrniirgo 
a i ' i t ' o a o « i v l c n l l a m l «>f U I M » I I I « I , la 
entitled to all the rights of a domi-
nant holder as against the servient 
holder, the same as if his land was 
not within the drainage district. 
fSee Am Jur "Drains and Sewers," 
§ 61.] 
Waters, § 74 — prescriptive rights — 
drainage of surface waters. 
4. The existence in favor of a land-
owner of an easement for drainage of 
surface waters across lands of another 
through an artificial ditch used for 
that purpose for many years, and his 
right to have the ditch cleaned out 
and restored, do not depend upon 
the legal establishment of the drain-
age ditch but may rest upon prescrip-
tion. 
[See Am Jur "Easements," § 85.] 
Waters, § 74 — drainage of surface 
waters — prescriptive right. 
5. An easement for the flow of sur-
face waters across the lands of an-
other exists by prescription where it 
appears that an artificial drainage 
ditch across the servient land had 
been openly used for more than forty 
years, under claim of right, to convey 
surface waters from the dominant 
estate across the servient estate to 
an outlet to a lake. 
fSee Am Jur "Easements/1 S «5.1 
Wttlelci, 9 1)0 — aUl f r t t c * u l i ' i » 
drainage — blocking of. 
6. An easement existing in favor of 
a dominant estate for the flow of sur-
face waters across a road and thence 
across lands of another may not bo 
blocked up either by the highway au-
thorities or by the owner of the 
servient land. 
Highways, § 13 — defects in highways 
— blocking surface drainage — 
construction of culvert — cost of. 
7. When county highway authori-
ties, in grading a highway, remove 
a culvert through which surface wa-
ters from abutting land drained into 
an artificial watercourse across ser-
vient land on the opposite side of the 
highway, the cost of restoring the 
culvert to permit free flowage of sur-
face waters from the dominant lands 
into the drainage ditch must be 
borne by the county. 
[See Am Jur "Easement?," 8 108. | 
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APPEAL by plaintiff from an adverse decree of the District Court, Harri-
son County, in an action for a mandatory injunction to require defendant 
Board of Supervisors to restore a culvert, and defendant landowners to 
permit a drainage ditch to be cleaned out and maintained, as an outlet for 
discharge of surface waters from plaintiff's land. Decree reversed and 
cause rcmandtd. 
Roy E. Havens, of Logan, and De 
Vere Watson, of Council Bluffs, for 
appellants: 
Where a drainage ditch has been 
onn*tnn*teil with th* kno\vlr<^p ;uicl 
t • • i i n e n l *.f I lie*. u i \ M e l «»f i l i r l u m l 
through which it runs and has been 
maintained for more than ten years 
without objection on the part of the 
original owner or his grantees an 
easement and enforceable right there-
in is acquired. Ehler v. Stier, 205 
Iowa 673, 216 NW 637; Hatton v. 
Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132 NW 1101; 
Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152 
NW 26; Schwartz v. Wapello County, 
208 Iowa 1229, 227 NW 91; Jacobson 
v. Camden, — Towa —, 20 NW2d 407. 
The statutes of Iowa impose a duty 
upon officers having charge of high-
ways to maintain openings therein to 
permit surface water to escape in its 
natural and established course to 
servient lands, and performance of 
that duty may be compelled by the 
courts. Pate v. Rogers, 193 Iowa 726, 
187 NW 451; Jacobson v. Camden, — 
Iowa —, 20 NW2d 470. 
As to whether or not they will per-
form such mandatory ministerial duty 
they have no legal discretion. 34 Am 
Jur, Mandamus, p 859, § 70; p 862, 
S 72; p 969, § 197; Pierce v. Green, 
229 Iowa 22, 294 NW 237, 131 ALR 
335; Bredt v. Franklin County, 227 
Iowa 1230, 290 NW 669. 
Welch & Welch and William P. 
Welch, all of I f^ran, for Verna R. 
Wt-lrli mid Willi .in I\ W«•!• h. 
Wright & Kbtle. of Council Bluffs, 
for trustees of the estate of G. M. 
Dodge, deceased. 
Harold E. Hanson, of Logan, for 
William Waiters, K L. Brundige, and 
J. C. Hammitt, County Supervisors of 
Harrison County, Iowa. 
Mulroney, J. 
Sections 23 and 24 in Cincinnati 
Township in Harrison County are 
separated by a north and south coun-
ty road. Plaintiffs, Nixon and Bier-
ring, own land along the east side of 
the road in section 24 and the de-
fendant, Verna Welch, owns land 
along the west side of the road in 
section 23. Plaintiffs sued Verna 
Welch and her husband and the 
board of supervisors alleging that 
(ho qtirfstrn Will or »lr.iiniu| aouth 
across the west part ol the Nixon 
land onto the Bierring land and 
thence, until the year 1940, westerly 
through a culvert under the road 
onto the Welch land and through an 
open ditch extending in a southwest-
erly direction across the Welch land 
to a lake along the west side of the 
Welch land. The petition alleged 
that in 1940 the board had caused 
the road to be graded and the culvert 
removed and that the ditch across 
the Welch land had become filled 
with soil; that the culvert and the 
ditch across the Welch land were all 
a part of an established drainage 
system known as the Bowman ditch 
established in 1878 by the joint ac-
tion of the owners of the land in 
sections 23 and 24 and the owners 
of other lands lying to the north of 
Nixon's land. The petition claimed 
an easement in favor of plaintiffs 
for the flow of surface water across 
the highway and across the Welch 
land, and the right to have the cul-
vert restored and the ditch across 
the Welch land cleaned out and 
maintained as an outlet. The peti-
tion nllrjjvd Hnmiif/r i by rranon of 
the damming up of the surface wa-
ter and the prayer was for a man-
datory injunction to compel the 
board to restore the culvert and to 
require the defendant Verna Welch 
to permit the ditch across her land 
to be cleaned out and maintained as 
an outlet for the surface water flow-
ing from plaintiffs' land and for 
general equitable relief. 
The portions of Verna Welch's an-
swer that are responsive to the 
claims of plaintiffs deny that the 
Bowman ditch was ever "construct-
ed under proceedings of the Board of 
NIXON v. 
f— low* —. 1S9 ALR 
Supervisors of Harrison County" 
and assert the records merely show 
a proposal for a ditch that was aban-
doned and never maintained; that 
there never has been any drainage, 
natural or artificial of the surface 
water from plaintiffs* land across 
the road and across the Welch land 
and that plaintiffs' land is in fact 
lower than the Welch land. The 
board of supervisors adopted the 
Wolch nnswiT ;»n«I further yilh'irrd 
l l l i ' lr |H I'tk't'i-rsMtU ":i in «iltii'i* i i i l viM«*d 
a sound discretion in not construct-
ing the culvert. The defendants, 
trustees of the Estate of G. M. 
Dodge, are the holders of a mort-
gage on the Welch land and their 
counsel stated in open court they 
would abide by any decree without 
pleading. 
The trial court heard much evi-
dence of witnesses who had been 
familiar with this land for many 
years. Some of them had known the 
land for more than half a century, 
some for forty years and others for 
somewhat lesser periods of time. It 
was all to the effect that a swale 
extended from the northern bound-
ary of Nixon's land in a southwest-
ern direction to the old culvert site 
near the southwestern corner of the 
Bierring land and thence across the 
Welch land to the lake; that this 
swale was the watercourse that 
drained the Nixon and Bierring 
land, though it perhaps did operate 
with decreasing efficiency as the 
years went on and the ditch grad-
ually filled in. The records with 
rcM|»i'ft to th«* old lti»\vni:in ilitrli 
wore introduced ami this *\%ak* fol-
lowed the course of that ditch. The 
testimony of the witnesses was well 
supported by photographs showing 
the line of the depression, and by the 
county engineer. There was some 
testimony that at the time of trial 
some of the water pockets on the 
Nixon land would, in times of heavy 
rainfall, drain north into a road 
ditch along paved highway 30 which 
runs along the north side of the 
Nixon land, but the evidence did 
establish that the natural drainage 
of the west part of section 24 was 
WELCH 1143 
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in a southwesterly direction and 
that the Welch land was slightly 
lower than the plaintiffs' land. The 
record with respect to the Bowman 
ditch shows proceedings commenc-
ing in 1877 when the respective own-
ers of the land petitioned the board 
for its establishment; the letting of 
the contract, and the assessments to 
pay for its construction. One wit-
ness, William Sproul, who had been 
filmili.#ir wi th lh\< l;iii<) *iiir«- | . * T ; 
l i ^ l i l n il Dull lii* lul|i«-il c l t i i t i nut (In 
Bowman ditch in 1903 or 1904 and 
he stated: "The Township Trustees 
paid us for that cleanout job in 
1903 and 1904. At that time the 
trustees had authority to levy their 
own taxes, funds and their own 
drainage funds. They haven't that 
authority now." 
It was undisputed that the culvert 
was destroyed when the road was 
graded in 1940. But the record 
shows that it would be of little ad-
vantage to plaintiffs to merely re-
store the culvert now for the ditch 
across the Welch land has partially 
filled in. During late years part of 
the ditch on the Welch land was so 
shallow that the land was cultivated 
across the ditch. 
I. The defendants introduced the 
records with respect to another 
drainage ditch called the Wilson 
ditch which runs in a north and 
south direction through the sections 
lying immediately east of section 24. 
These records show that all of plain-
tiffs' land lies in this Wilson drain-
age district. Upon this last docu-
mentary «»vidnir«- with r«*i|M«l l«» 
the Wilson drainage district, Uu-
trial court based his decision that 
he was without jurisdiction to com-
pel the opening of the culvert or the 
ditch across the Welch land. The 
trial court in his decree stated: 
". . . to grant the prayer of plain-
tiffs' petition would be an attempt 
to usurp the power and authority 
of the Board of Supervisors given to 
it by statute to determine the course 
of drainage within the said Wilson 
Drainage District." But there was 
some evidence that there was high 
ground on the plaintiffs' land bv-
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tween the western part of plaintiffs* 
land and the Wilson ditch. It is 
somewhat significant that the east 
and west lateral to the Wilson ditch 
across section 24, as originally pro-
posed, was to start at the west side 
of section 24 and on the center line 
of the section. This was changed, 
upon the engineers' recommendation 
so that the lateral as finally con-
structed starts with the center of 
the section. As stated there was 
abundant evidence that the land in 
the west portion of section 24 
drained south and west. The plain-
tiffs on this appeal, in many divi-
sions in their brief, argue that the 
evidence firmly establishes that the 
drainage of the west part of their 
land was south and west over the 
course of the old Bowman ditch, 
through the culvert across the road, 
:iinl t In «»ii|rlt lh«* i l i t t ' l i urnwin tlu-
Uclch land. We have not detailed 
all of the evidence, for the defend-
ants in their brief did not reply to 
the foregoing divisions in plaintiffs9 
brief but rely entirely on the propo-
sition stated by the trial court, 
namely: That since plaintiffs9 land 
was within the Wilson drainage dis-
trict then this "conclusively shows 
the drainage is to the east." De-
fendants state in their brief that 
they pleaded as a defense to plain-
tiffs' petition that the plaintiffs9 land 
was within the Wilson Drainage Dis-
trict. No such defense was in fact 
pleaded. We are not directed to any 
authorities holding that the estab-
lishment of a drainage district de-
prives the landowners therein of the 
rights to the free flowage of surface 
water as between dominant and 
servient holders of land within the 
district when the established ditch 
does not in fact drain off such sur-
face water into the ditch. We hold 
that the mere fact that the land is 
within an established drainage dis-
trict is not enough to preclude the 
owner of the land from asserting 
rights with respect to surface water 
that he would have if the land was 
not included in the district. If he 
can show that part of his land was 
not in fact drained by 
Headnou 3 the established ditch 
but was in fact a domi-
nant tract and drained by another 
natural or long established artificial 
watercourse across the servient land 
he is entitled to all the rights of the 
dominant holder as against the ser-
vient holder, the same as if the land 
was not within the drainage district. 
We think the evidence here clearly 
shows that the west part of plain-
tiffs' land was not drained by the 
Wilson ditch; that the drainage was 
to the south and west in the swale 
still partially existing from the old 
Bowman ditch that extends across 
the Welch land. 
II. Defendants argue that the 
Bowman ditch was not legally estab-
lished. Of course they moan the 
:tiu i<-ut rfi-onlM now availal»K- ilo nut 
show that every step required by law 
with respect to its establishment 
was complied with. But plaintiffs9 
rights do not depend upon the legal 
establishment of the Bowman ditch. 
The fact remains that there was 
such a ditch once dug and it re-
mained a watercourse for the drain-
age of plaintiffs9 land until partially 
destroyed by the filling, up of that 
portion of the watercourse that was 
on the Welch land and completely 
destroyed by the destruction of the 
culvert by the board of supervisors 
when the road was graded in 1940. 
Plaintiffs9 rights to the 
Headnote 4 relief demanded depend 
upon whether they have 
acquired an easement in the water-
course and even if the Bowman ditch 
was not legally established it can 
still be an artificial watercourse up-
on which easement rights can be 
based if acquired by prescription. 
The rule is stated in 67 CJ 901 and 
902, section 330: 
"An artificial channel, as well as 
a natural channel, may be a water-
course . . . By what is said to be 
the weight of authority, that which 
was at first an artificial channel will 
become a natural watercourse when 
for all of the years of the prescrip-
tive period it has taken the place, 
NIXON v. 
<— Iowa —. U» A L * 
and served principally in lieu, of a 
natural channel. Likewise, where 
neighborhood drainage ditches have 
been opened by common consent and 
used for a series of years, they be-
come watercourse as fully as if they 
were not of artificial origin, and 
especially after the period of pre-
scription has run." 
III. The record here shows that 
the easement existed in favor of the 
dominant estate for the flow of sur-
face water across the road and 
across the Welch land. It existed 
either by virtue of the concert of 
action by the ancient owners of all 
this land through which the Bow-
man ditch was constructed or it 
existed by prescription in that it 
was shown to be a water-
Headnou 6 course openly used under 
a claim of riirht to con 
v«\v tl»«* • •ur fnr i* Wii t i - i f i o i u t I n - « t i u i i i 
nant estate across the servient es-
tate to the lake outlet. See Ehler v. 
Stier, 205 Iowa 678, 216 NW 637: 
Hatton v. Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132 
NW 1101; Neuhring v. Schmidt, 130 
Iowa 401, 106 NW 630; Vannest v. 
Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 NW 906, 
8 LRA 277, 18 Am St Rep 387. 
Our holding that the easement 
existed means of course that the de-
fendant board and the 
He*4note c defendant Welch could 
not block up the water-
course. With respect to the board 
of supervisors, see Jacobson v. Cam-
den, Iowa, 20 NW2d 407, 408, and 
cases there cited. In this case Jus-
tice Garfield, speaking for the court, 
stated: 
"It is the duty of highway au-
thorities to place openings in high-
way grades so as to permit surface 
water to escape in its natural course 
from the higher to the lower lands." 
IV. But there is no evidence that 
the ditch on the Welch land was 
stopped up by action of the land-
owner. While there is some evi-
dence that the Welch land was cul-
tivated over part of the ditch in re-
cent years, the plaintiffs concede that 
the stoppage in the Welch ditch was 
from natural causes due to its filling 
up with dirt. The engineer testi-
WELCH 1145 
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fied that the bottom of the Welch 
ditch would have to be lowered ap-
proximately 3 feet in order ade-
quately to drain off the surface 
water from plaintiffs' land. 
It is the law that the owner of the 
servient estate, over whose land an 
easement exists in a wa-
Headnote i tercourse. in favor of 
the owner of the domi-
nant estate, must permit the cleaning 
out of the watercourse across his 
land. See, Wessels v. Colebank, 174 
111 618, 51 NE 639; Bowman v. 
Bradley, 127 Or 45, 270 P 919; Dahl-
berg v. Lannen, 84 Mont 68, 274 V 
151; Lamb v. Lamb, 177 NC 150. 
98 SE 307; Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 
200, 125 P 403, 44 LRA NS 89; 
Pvott v. State. 170 Ind 118, 83 NE 
737; 67 CJ 907. 
Il l W V ^ r l : V Pi»li*l»sml.. :ll|»l:i 
I I V 1 HI 1>KH, o l M L t i41J , llu- o p i n -
i o n s t a t e s : 
MThe right to keep in repair a 
way is fully established. The cases 
on the subject of obstruction erected 
in or to watercourses or drains are 
quite numerous, but there seem to 
be few authorities in regard to the 
right of entering upon the land of 
the owner of the servient heritage, 
and removing obstructions occur-
ring through natural causes in an 
artificial channel. In Chapman v. 
[Thames] Manufacturing Co. 13 
Conn 269 [33 Am Dec 401], it was 
held that obstructions in an artifi-
cial channel, through which there 
exists the prescriptive right to flow 
the waters of a lake, though occa-
sioned by natural causes, may be 
removed by the persons whose lands 
are overflowed, without there being 
any right on the part of the owner 
of the channel to object. In Roberts 
v. Roberts, 55 NY 275, the former 
owner of a tract of land had drained 
the upper part of it, by means of 
a ditch, into the lower part, and 
afterwards conveyed the tract in 
two parts to different persons. In 
an action by the owner of the upper 
tract against the owner of the lower 
tract the court said: 4If the ditch 
got out of repair by reason of floods 
or washing away its banks, or oth-
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erwise, it was the legal right of the 
plaintiff to repair it, so as to restore 
it to its original condition, and make 
it subserve the purpose which it 
»>i in i t i a l l y HlVi'lc'il, n f I'ttrryiiiK • *lT 
the water of the stream. He was en-
titled to have the ditch kept up as 
it was when he purchased, and to 
keep it in that condition, and, if 
necessary, to enter upon the defend-
ant's lands to make repairs, doing 
no unnecessary injury.' In Liford's 
Case, 11 Coke, 46b, it is said: The 
law giveth power to him who ought 
to repair a bridge to enter into the 
land, and to him who hath a con-
duit within the land of another to 
enter the land and mend it, when 
cause requireth, as it was resolved 
in 9 Edw IV pi 35/ where it was 
held that the right to scour and 
amend a trench was incident to a 
grant of a right to dig it in another's 
land for the purpose of drawing 
water through the same; and the 
same doctrine is sustained in Peter 
v. Daniel, 5 CB 568. Washb Easem, 
c 6, § 1, pi 4. It would seem, there-
fore, that the common law annexes 
to the easement of a drain in anoth-
er's land the right to go upon such 
land, and clean out or repair such 
drain without doing unnecessary 
injury to the land/' 
In Dahlbcrg v. Lunuen, supra [SI 
Mont 68, 274 P 154], it is stated: 
"It is well settled that a person 
having an easement in a ditch 
through the land of another may go 
upon the servient land and make all 
necessary repairs and clean the 
ditch. 9 RCLP 795; Holm v. Davis. 
41 Utah 200, 125 P 403, 44 LRA NS 
89; Carson v. Gentner, 33 Or 512, 
52 P 506, 43 LRA }30/' 
In Holm v. Davis, supra, there is 
a quotation from Jones on Ease-
ments. The opinion states [41 Utah 
200, 125 P 407] : 
"The right of the owner of an 
easement is admirably stated by Mr. 
Jones in his excellent work on Ease-
ments, § 814, in the following words: 
The owner of a dominant estate 
having an easement has a right to 
enter upon the servient estate, and 
make repairs necessary for the rea-
sonable and convenient use of the 
easement, doing no unnecessary in-
jury to the servient estate/ A large 
number of cases in support of the 
iliH'Irhit* nri* f o l h i t r i i by DM* tni l l im* 
in a footnote to the section afore-
said to which we refer the reader. 
The doctrine is also well illustrated 
and applied to an irrigating ditch 
by the Supreme Court of California 
in Joseph v. Ager, 108 Cal 517, 41 
P 422/' 
The rule and illustration is thus 
stated in 17 Am Jur 1004: 
"The dominant owner has the 
right of access to make repairs and 
may enter upon the servient estate 
for this purpose. He may not, how-
ever, inflict any necessary injury. 
To illustrate: A person having an 
easement in a ditch running through 
the land of another may go upon 
the servient land and use so much 
thereof on either side of the ditch 
as may be required to make all nec-
essary repairs and to clean out the 
ditch at all reasonable times; he is 
liable only for the abuse of this 
right. It has also been held that 
the right of access is not limited 
to purposes of repairing, but may 
be exercised to make original con-
structions necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the easement/' 
The case of Mutton v. Cnle, 132 
Iowa 485, 132 N\V 1101, is much 
in point. There the defendant, a 
servient owner, sought, in a cross-
bill, an injunction forbidding plain-
tiff, the dominant owner, from 
cleaning out a ditch across the de-
fendant's land which had been es-
tablished many years ago. The 
court held the plaintiff had an ease-
ment and denied the injunction for-
bidding him from cleaning out the 
ditch. 
We held in Bina v. Bina, 213 Iowa 
432, 239 XW 68, 78 ALR 1216. that 
the owner of a road easement across 
the land of another was entitled to 
repair the road to render it a suit-
able passage way. As stated in 
Bowman v. Bradley, supra [127 Or 
45, 270 P 922], the easement for the 
flowage of water "differs from no 
other easement across the land of 
NIXON v. 
<— low* —. 169 ALR 
another/* It is our holding that 
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief 
demanded; that they are entitled 
to have the culvert restored and the 
ditch across th«» Welch Inml rimmed 
out. 
V. As to the costs for construct-
ing the culvert, it is clear that this 
should be borne by the 
He*di»ie i county. The culvert was 
destroyed by the county 
in breach of its duty to place an 
opening to permit the free flowage 
of surface water, Jacobson v. Cam-
den, supra. 
VI. There is no showing by the 
plaintiff that the open ditch would 
benefit the Welch land. In plain-
tiffs' original petition there was no 
prayer that the owner of the Welch 
land clean out the ditch and no 
prayer that the cleaning out of the 
ditch be done at the expense of 
Verna Welch. The prayer was mere-
ly for a mandatory injunction re-
quiring Verna R. Welch to permit 
the cleaning out of the ditch. In 
a subsequent reply plaintiffs alleged 
their willingness to pay their "pro-
portionate share of the expense of 
such clean out." There is no evi-
dence upon which we could make 
any fair apportionment. Ordinarily 
the owner of an easement across the 
WELCH 1147 
1141. 24 KW2d 4?€) 
land of another has the duty to re-
pair the easement when he is the 
only party benefited by the ease-
ment 
It i •. o u r liolilitit? Ilt.it tin- . n t i K 
cost of the cleaning out of the ditch 
on the Welch land be 
HeadiMU t borne by plaintiffs. We 
do not mean to imply 
that we would in an injunction ac-
tion like this ever apportion costs 
in view of our statutes for the es-
tablishment of drainage districts 
and subdrainage districts whore 
costs can be better apportioned. 
Plaintiffs sought a mandatory in-
junction to permit the cleaning out 
of the ditch on the Welch land. 
That injunction we give them but 
at their expense and subject to the 
rule that they commit no unneces-
sary damage. The culvert will be 
restored at the expense of th<-
county. The decree of the trial 
court is reversed and the cause re-
manded for decree in conformity 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
All Justices concur, except Hays, 
J., who takes no part. 
Petition for rehearing denied 
January 17, 1947. 
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II. Rights and duties of dominant owners, in general: 
a. Rights, 1148. 
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I. Introduction 
As a general rule, in the absence of 
an agreement, the owner of land sub-
its enjoyment is not bound to keep 
such means in repair or to sustain any 
expense in maintaining them in a 
ject to an easement of a nature which proper condition. The duty and pn\i-
requires the maintenance of means for lege of constructing an easement or 
+ Consult ALR BLUE BOOK for cases s u k ^ a e n t to publication date • 
ADDENDUM "B" 
ln*# that be knew the power line and the 
i J T i t crossed his land; that the market 
• * #
 0 f the defendant's farm, tef ore the 
HOLM v. DAVIS 403 
^ _ _ ctlon of the power line was not to 
2 w t i f $10,000; that the market value of the 
y j ^ . gtrip without the poles upon it was 
S > and with the poles $40; and that the 
Zance of the farm.was not injured nor the 
fjtrittt Talue of it depreciated by reason of 
4 * construction and maintenance of the 
gfirrr line. Then, in response to further 
l o t i o n s propounded to him on his direct 
fgtintnntion, he further stated that he was 
fifju:'.Intcd with sales of lands similar in 
character to the defendant's land, and that 
It bad knowledge of the sale of a particu-
lar tract near the defendant's land, and that 
te obtained such information from the agent 
«f the parties who had purchased the tract 
Xlnreupon the court, on its own motion, ob-
grrved: "You are seeking to prove particular 
m\t+, are you? Counsel for Plaintiff: Yes, 
*r." The court stated: "That is not admis-
dft'.e under the rule on direct examination" 
«4tid observed that such things may be in-
qelrrd about on cross-examination, and then 
m redirect, but not on the direct examina-
tion. "Counsel: Do I understand the court 
t§ rule, then, that the witness on direct ex-
amination cannot give his statement of par-
ticular values of similar property? Court: 
t t t : that is the uniform practice." This 
fttling is complained of. As stated in 1 El-
•att, Ev. f 180, Jones, Ev. (2d Ed.) { 168, 
tftd 13 Ency. Ev. pp. 457-463, there is a 
Barked conflict of opinion as to the compe-
tecy of evidence on direct examination to 
ifcow the sale price of other lands of general 
Mailarity in location, character, and adapta-
titty to use of the lands sold with those the 
taloe of which is in question, and of sales 
totde about the time the value of the latter 
•Kitt be established. The cases supporting 
• * affirmative and those the negative of the 
It^'osition are there noted. Even though 
* * conclusion' should be reached that such 
* i « may properly be shown on the direct 
•Uinluation, yet we are clearly of the opin-
*•* that in this instance the plaintiff was 
• * harmed by the ruling. The wimess had 
•J**tdy stated that he had bought and sold 
•tods; that he knew of sales of lands simi-
** to that of the defendant; that he knew 
*** market value of such lands and the 
••**et value of the defendant's land, and 
••ted what that was, and the amoT i^t which 
• bis opinion the value of the defendant's 
J ^ was depreciated by reason of the con-
junction of the power line over it. In such 
*•* the plaintiff was not prejudiced even 
,
"
0Q&h it be assumed that it, on u e direct 
^njination of the witness, was entitled to 
*ow Bales of other lands. Seattle k M. Ry. 
^
 T
- Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. 739; 
I**1* v. Boston, 1G5 Mass. 88, 42 >\ E. 506; 
E. 970, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 124 Am. S t 
Rep. 528. At any rate, it is not such an er-
ror, if there be one, as requires a reversal 
of the judgment. 
We are of the opinion that no reversible 
error is shown, and that the judgment of the 
court below ought therefore to be affirmed, 
with costs. It is so ordered. 
FRICK, C. J-, and McCARTY, J.f concur. 
HOLM v. DAVIS et a l 
(Supreme Court of Utah. June 12, 1912.) 
1. TRIAL (§ 400*) — FINDINGS—AMENDMENT. 
Comp. Laws 1907, $ 3005, confers jurisdic-
tion on the court under certain circumstances 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
other proceeding taken against him through his 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect on such terms with reference to costs as 
may be proper, etc., and section 3168 pro-
vides that, on the trial of a question of fact 
by the court, its decision must be given in 
writing and filed with the clerk within 30 days 
after the cause is submitted for decision, but 
that the court at any time before notice of ap-
peal is served or filed, or before motion for 
a new trial is ruled on, may add to or modify 
the findings in any respect so as to make the 
same conform to the issues presented by the 
pleadings and to the evidence adduced at the 
trial, but that no such additions to or modifi-
cations of the findings shall be made, unless 
notice in writing, specifying generally the addi-
tions or modifications desired, shall have been 
served on the adverse party or his attorney. 
Held that, independent of such sections, the 
court, after the expiration of the term at which 
an action was tried and determined, notwith-
standing the pendency of a motion to retax 
costs, had no jurisdiction to modify the find-
ings on its own motion. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. 
Dig. i§ 949, 950; Dec Dig. $ 400.*J 
2. LICENSES (§ 44*)—USE OF REAL PROPERTY 
—EASEMENT DISTINGUISHED. 
Where intervener constructed and used a 
canal over plaintiff's land for a millrace and ir-
rigation ditch to furnish water for motive pow-
er for the mill, and to irrigate certain lands, 
and such canal, though originally constructed 
by consent of plaintiff's grantor, had been used 
and maintained for such purposes for more 
than twenty years when plaintiff purchased the 
same, intervener's right to maintain, protect, 
and improve it was not a mere license, but an 
easement acquired by prescription. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Licenses, 
Cent. Dig. §§ 97-99; Dec Dig. § 44.*] 
3. WATERS AND WATEB COURSES ($ 154*)— 
WATER CANAL*—MAINTENANCE. 
Where intervener had acquired a prescrip-
tive easement to maintain a water canal over 
plaintiff's land, intervener was entitled to enter 
on the land to clean out and make necessary 
repairs to the canal, doing no unnecessary in-jury to the servient estate. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Waters and 
Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 167-179; Dec. 
Dig. § 154.»] 
4. MASTER A^D SERVANT (§ 302*)—INJURIES 
TO THIRD PERSONS—TEESPASS BY SERVANTS. 
Where defendant, having an easement to 
maintain a water canal over plainrif"s land, 
sent workmen to clean ou: and repair :he canal, 
a finding that they trespassed on gr-und not 
| necessary for their work wns inen«~:—* ~^ 
*v* JLZD r\AV,lU 1\J KHirUKTiUH 
so trespassing the workmen acted beyond the 
scope of their employment, rendering them-
selves, and not intervener, liable for their acts. [Ed. Note.—For otter cases, see Master and 
Servant, Cent. Dig. f| 1217-1221, 1225, 1229; 
Dec. Dig. i 302.*] 
Appeal from District Court, Utah County; 
J. E. Booth, Judge. 
Action by Annes Holm against Warren E. 
Davis, in which the Spanish Fork Co-opera-
tive Institution intervened. Judgment for 
plaintiff, and intervener appeals. Reversed 
and remanded. 
A. Saxey, of Spanish Fork, for appellant. 
Elias Hanson, of Sjanish Fork, for respond-
ent. 
FRICK, C. J. The respondent commenced 
this action against the defendant 'Davis to 
recover damages for trespasses that it is al-
leged said Davis by himself and "by his 
agents" had committed on respondent's land, 
which is specifically described in the com-
plaint. Davis answered, justifying the al-
leged trespasses. His answer is, however, 
not material to the real questions involved 
here, and therefore will not be referred to 
hereafter. The apx^llant asked and was 
given leave to intervene in the action com-
menced against Davis as aforesaid, and in 
its complaint in intervention it in substance 
alleged that the fee to the land in question 
was in the respondent; that it was the own-
er, and for many years prior to the com-
mencement of the action had been the own-
er, of a flouring mill which it operated by 
water power, which water was obtained from 
Spanish Fork river by means of a canal or 
ditch about three miles in length; that said 
canal or ditch passed through respondent's 
land, and that the same was constructed, 
owned, occupied, and used by appellant for 
the purposes of conducting water through 
the same to said mill for a period of 25 
years without molestation or interference 
from any one, and for about 23 years before 
the respondent purchased and became the 
owner of the land in question; that the ap-
pellant claims the rizht to use, maintain, 
and repair said canal as an easement over 
said land, and that :he acts complained of 
by respondent were committed by appellants 
agents and employes by going on and along 
said canal or ditch fcr the purpose of mak-
ing repairs that were necessary and requir-
ed, and for that purpose removed sand and 
gravel that had accumulated in said canal, 
and which had to te removed to permit 
the necessary water to flow through the 
same to said mill; tint said sand and grav-
el were carefully removed and deposited 
along the margin of tie bank of said canal, 
and that no unnecessary thing was done or 
act committed in doinr said work. Respond-
ent answered the complaint, admitting the 
allegations therein, except that appellant 
over his land. The issues were tried t*j 
court without a jury. The court, after i _ 
ing a personal inspection of the canal j 
ditch, on the 27th day of May, 1911, 
the following findings of fact and •< 
sions of law; "That the plaintiff is the < 
er of the land described in his complj 
that the defendant, the Spanish Fork 
operative Institution, a corporation,.&n] 
millrace, which race is also used as a*] 
rigation canal, running through the 
land on a sidehill, and has maintained 
canal for more than 20 years, and 
was built with the consent of the then 
er of the land; that it is necessary 
year to year that the said canal should' 
cleared out and repaired; that the defi 
ant Warren E. Davis, in May, 1910, at 
employe of the said defendant corpora 
with the assistance of other men, cle 
out and repaired the said ditch; that 
performing the work necessary thereto 
unnecessary damage or injury was done 
the ground of the plaintiff, but the work 
trespassed on ground not necessary for < 
work; that neither of said defendants 
ther made or attempted to make any. 
rangements with the plaintiff whereby 
might go onto plaintiff's ground :fo* 
performance of said work; that the 
tiff has sustained only nominal dan 
Judgment should therefore be for the 
tiff that he recover damages in the sun] 
$1, and that the defendant, the 
Fork Co-operative Institution, a corpoi^t 
pay the said sum of $1, and the. cogbN 
this suit." The appeal is upon the jud 
roll without a bill of exceptions contti 
the evidence. All that we can deter 
therefore, is whether the pleadings and i 
ings of fact sustain the conclusions of lil 
and judgment. 
[1] It is not necessary to refer to the p* 
ings further than has been done. As 
have seen, the findings constituting the 
cision of the court were filed on the 
day of May, 1911, during the April tern-
court. Thereafter, to wit, on the 26th 
of August, 1911, after the April term 
court had been adjourned without date, 
pending the July term, the court modified 
findings of fact by inserting that portio*| 
thereof which we have italicized. Appd4 
lant at the time obje:ted to the court's t*"| 
thority to make the modification in the to*| 
ings, and now insists that the court exceedy 
ed its power or jurisdiction in making 
modification of the findings as indica 
and that, therefore, for the purposes of 
decision, said modification must be d< 
as not having been made. Did the court «* 
ceed its power in making the modiflcat*°^ j 
complained of by appellant? It is prad 
ly conceded by respondent, at least it is *<*| 
controverted by him. that the findings 
J / S I -
modification thereof was made in the fol-< Treating the findings, therefore, as orig-
v!!ring July t e n n - W e 6ha11 a s s u m e tfaat tofrlly m a^e and filed by the court, do they 
<jer the decisions of this court the district
 (sustain the conclusions of law and judgment 
^ort had the power to modify its findings entered against appellant for the sum of $1 
*# anv time before the adjournment of the damages and for costs? Counsel for appel-
tenn during which they were made and fil-
* and that said modification could also 
bo made if made in accordance with the pro-
visions of Comp. Laws 1907, I 3168, or un-
der the provisions of section 3005. In the 
case at bar, the findings were, however, 
modified after the term, and no attempt 
*•*«* made to conform to the provisions of 
either one of the foregoing sections. The 
question, therefore, is, Did the court of its 
oun motion have the power to make a modi-
fication of its findings at the time and in 
the manner disclosed by this record? Re-
indent's counsel seeks to justify the ac-
tion of the court on the ground that appel-
lant had filed a motion to retax costs during 
the April term which remained pending and 
was finally disposed of by the court on the 
26th day of August and at the time the 
modification was made, all of which was 
during the July term. The motion to retax | 
costs was based upon the findings as they 
then stood, and vmdei which appellant's 
counsel contended his client could not be 
required to pay costs under our statute. The 
court seemed to appreciate the force of 
counsel's contention in that regard, and thus 
modified the findings so that the costs could 
legally be taxed against appellant. The mo-
tion to retax costs certainly was not made 
nor intended for the purpose of having the 
court modify its findings under the provi-
sions of section 3168 or under section 3005, 
supra. Indeed, the motion was filed and in-
tended for an entirely different purpose. 
The motion therefore was not and in the 
nature of things could not have invoked the 
power of the court to modify its findings 
within the purview of the two sections re-
ferred to. Nor, in view that the term of 
court at which the findings were made and 
filed had been finally adjourned, did the 
<t»urt possess inherent power to make the 
modification complained of. That the court 
cannot legally mafce modification of its find-
ing after the term has expired when such 
nullification is not made under and in con-
formity with the provisions of either one 
or the other of sections 3168 or 3005, supra, 
so a* to extend the time within which to 
tal- an appeal was held by us in the case 
of Atwood v. 'Davis at the October, 1911, 
tern of this court. The question having 
***-£ determined on a motion to dismiss the 
aP>al, no opinion was filed, but the ap-
**&'- dismissed. We are of the opinion, 
therefore, that the court in making the 
toO'Ilfication of the findings as aforesaid on 
iK
 wn motion after the term had expired 
**c—ded its power, and that the findings 
U|us:. for the purjoses of this decision, be 
treated as though no such nmHifinoHAn 
laflt insists that, in view that the court 
found that the canal or ditch in question had 
been constructed over appellant's land for 
more than a sufficient length of time to con-
stitute said canal or 'ditch an easement on 
or over his land, therefore appellant had a 
legal right to enter upon and along said ca-
nal or ditch to repair and clean out the same 
if the work was done without unnecessary 
injury to respondent's land or property, and 
therefore appellant was not guilty of tres-
pass, and, if this be so, the conclusion of law 
and judgment for damages and costs are not 
enstained by said findings, and cannot pre-
vail. Counsel for respondent contends that, 
because the court found that the canal was 
originally constructed "with the consent of 
the then owner of the land" in question here, 
the canal was constructed and maintained 
under a license from the owner of the land, 
and that, where such is the case, no ease-
ment is acquired. aBd therefore none exists 
in this case* The foregoing contentions pre-
sent the real question in the case. 
[2] We have no means of determining 
what the evidence was, and the court's find-
ings are far from specific. In view, howev-
er, that both parties have expressed an ear-
nest desire that we should, if possible un-
der the findings as they are, determine 
whether the canal in question constitutes an 
easement or not, we have concluded that in 
view of the permanent character of the ca-
nal and the purposes for and time during 
which it was constructed, maintained, and 
used, the findings are sufficient to enable us 
to determine that question, although the find-
ings are somewhat meager in detail. The 
findings show that the canal was construct-
ed and used for a millrace and irrigating 
ditch to furnish water for motive power for 
a mill, and to irrigate lands to make the 
same productive; that the canal had been 
constructed, maintained, and used for the 
pxuposes aforesaid lox more than 20 years 
when respondent purchased and became the 
owner of the land over which the canal was 
coLstructed and maintained. If the canal 
during the 20 years was maintained and 
us*d adversely and under a claim of right, 
such use for that length of time would have 
ril-rned into a prescriptive right constitut-
ing an easement. This has been the uniform 
holding of this court. See Lund v. Wilcox, 
34 Utah, 205, 97 Pac. 33, and cases there cit-
ed. Counsel for respondent in effect concede 
the law in this state to be so, but he con-
tends that, because the court found that the 
canU was originally constructed with the 
con-ent of the owner of the land, the claim 
of * dverse user uLder claim of right has no 
does not necessarily follow that because a 
ditch or any other permanent structure is 
constructed on or over the lands of another 
with such other's consent the use and main-
tenance thereof by the person who construct-
ed it or his assignee cannot be adverse and 
under a claim of right within the purview 
of the law governing easements acquired by 
prescription. The question to a large extent 
depends upon the character of the use or 
thing which is claimed as an easement, and 
the object or purpose for which the thing was 
constructed, used, and maintained. In this 
case the canal or ditch was constructed for 
a purpose which was permanent in its na-
ture. We may well assume that no one 
would build a mill and construct a canal 
three or more miles in length for the purpose 
of providing water for motive power to op-
erate the mill and irrigate the arid lands, ex-
cept as a permanent thing. That such is the 
case is natural, and must be obvious to all, 
and hence needs no argument or elaboration. 
The fact, therefore, that the canal was on 
the land and was being used for the purpos-
es aforesaid was notice to the respondent 
that it was a structure of a permanent char-
acter used for purposes permanent in their 
nature, and hence he purchased the land sub-
ject to the rights of the owner of the ca-
nal. If the right to use the same, therefore, 
had ripened into a prescriptive right by the 
lapse of time and the character of its use, 
respondent purchased and holds the land 
subject to appellant's right to maintain and 
use the canal for the purposes for which it 
was constructed, maintained, and used from 
its inception. This is well illustrated by the 
courts in the following cases: Jewett v. Hus-
sey, 70 Me. 433, and Coventon v. Seufert, 23 
Or. 548, 32 Pac. 508. In both of those cas-
es it is held that, although the inception of 
a prescriptive right rests in parol by the 
permission of the owner of the land over 
which it is claimed, yet, if the right of way 
or ditch is used and enjoyed under a claim 
of right to use and enjoy it as owners of 
such property usually use and enjoy their 
own, the claimant obtains a prescriptive 
right to the use of the easement. In Ar-
buckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 53, the court, in re-
ferring to this subject, says: "But the mere 
fact of showing that the use began by per-
mission of the landowner is not alone suffi-
cient to defeat the prescription.'' In Cov-
enton v. Seufert, supra, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon, in passing on how a right to use 
an irrigating ditch over the lands of another 
may be acquired by use, states the law in 
the following language: "That the use be-
gan by permission does not affect the pre-
scriptive right if it has been used and ex-
ercised for the requisite period under claim 
of right. * * * If the use of the way is 
under a parol consent given by the owner of 
the servient tenement to use it as if it were 
legally conveyed, it is a use as of right 
• • • The plaintiffs have used the ditch 
as if it had been legally conveyed to them .^ 
that is, they have exercised such acts o# 
ownership over it as a man would over h|{ 
own property—and the court must presuiu* 
in the absence of any evidence to the con* 
trary that the settlement was a parol con* 
sent or transfer * * * of the right to 
use the ditch, and hence it was a use as of 
right." The court also held that, in view 
that the party who claimed the easement 
had used it for the purposes intended for * 
period longer than would create a prescrip. 
tive right, "the burden of proving that plain, 
tiffs held possession by license or indulgence 
was cast upon the defendants." To the same 
effect, see Jones on Easements, f 1S2. 
[31 Keeping in mind, therefore, the per. 
manent character of the canal in question 
and the purposes for which it was construct. 
ed, used, and maintained, and that such use 
had been for a period longer than 20 yean, 
we are forced to the conclusion that the 
mere fact that the court found that the c*. 
nal was originally constructed "with the con-
sent of the then owner of the land" cannot 
affect appellant's prescriptive fight. If such 
were not the law, then in this state, in 
view of the arid character of the land em-
braced within its borders, but few irrigating 
ditches could now be maintained. This if 
apparent to all, for the reason that in many 
if not most instances such ditches were at 
least in part constructed over lands owned 
by others either with the express or implied 
permission or consent of the owners thereof. 
If the owners of lands over which ditches 
have been thus constructed can now claim, 
as is claimed by respondent, that the own-
ers and users of those ditches have acquired 
no right to maintain them for the reason 
that the ditches or canals were in fact con-
structed with the consent of the original 
owners of the lands, and hence the ditch 
users are mere licensees, and their ditches, 
flumes, and canals are maintained and used 
only by the sufferance or indulgence of the 
landowners, then the law has proved to be 
a mere delusion and a snare. In settling 
and reclaiming the arid lands much that in 
early days was deemed entirely worthless 
has now acquired considerable value. Over 
such lands miles of ditches, flumes, and ca-
nals were constructed with either the ex-
press or implied consent of the owners there-
of. Can such owners, after a lapse of ail 
these years, now treat the owners of the 
ditches as mere trespassers? We think not 
Upon the other hand, we are of the opinion | 
that, although a canal, ditch, or flume may 
have been constructed by a person on or over 
lands owned by another with the consent or 
permission of such other owner, yet, if the 
owner of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his 
assignee, has used and maintained the same 
in the same manner as if the same were 
constructed over his own lands, and where 
such use and maintenance has continued un-
in terrUDted lv a n d nnilai> /»1«Hm <\t ritrht tot 
than twenty years, in such event thej 
of the ditch has acquired a right to 
and maintain the same perpetually as 
casement 
view of the foregoing, what were the 
its of appellant with respect to entering 
the lands of respondent to repair and 
out the ditch or canal in question? 
right of the owner of an easement is 
ibly stated by Mr. Jones in his ex-
; work on Easements, § SI4, in the fol-
words: "The owner of a dominant 
ite^ having an easement has a right to 
iter upon the servient estate, and make re-
necessary for the reasonable and con-
it use of the easement, dcing no unnec-
iry injury to the servient estate." A 
Ijfcrge number of cases in support of the doc-
are collated by the author in a foot-
to the section aforesaid to which we re-
the reader. The doctrine is also well 
lostrated and applied to an irrigating ditch 
rthe Supreme Court of California in Joseph 
(A*erf 108 Cal. 517, 41 Pac. 422. The find-
In the case at bar "that in performing 
work necessary thereto no unnecessary 
ige or injury was done to the ground of 
plaintiff" while not as specific as could 
desired, yet must be construed to mean 
what appellant by its servants and em-
Fte had a right to do, namely, to enter 
respondent's land along the canal or 
in question for the purpose of repair-
and cleaning out the same, and, if in do-
;.the work no unnecessary injury was done 
respondent's land, appellant cannot be 
urged as a trespasser. Under the find-
as originally made, appellant therefore 
clearly within its rights in doing the 
complained of. It was only after the 
[court thought that it was necessary to change 
| the findings to support the judgment for 
[Mxninal damages and costs that appellant's 
[servants were charged with having trespass-
•ed on respondent's land. 
fo'W So far we have considered the question 
[ tpon the theory that the findings as modified 
Would make the appellant liable as a tres-
: passer. If the amendment by the court be 
^Considered and applied literally as written. 
[Ik may well be doubted whether appellant 
f%ouid be liable, even though the finding 
r.Were proper and true in fact. If appellant's 
^workmen trespassed on ground not neces-
ffary for said work" willfully, unnecessarily, 
Kind when not acting within the scope of 
[tiieir duties or employment in repairing or 
^eaning out the canal, they, and not appel-
it, should have been held as trespassers, 
^e, however, do not desire to base the de-
ion upon such narrow ground. What we 
is that under the facts found by the 
t the ditch or canal constitutes an ease-
&nt over respondent's land which appellant 
ad a right to maintain, and for that pur-
has a right to go upon the land of re-
spondent along the ditch, and to use so mucn 
thereof on either side of the ditch as may 
be necessary to make all necessary repairs 
and to clean out said ditch at all reason-
able times, and that appellant is liable only 
for the abuse of such right; that in this 
case no such abuse is shown, and hence the 
judgment against appellant cannot prevail. 
The judgment is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded to the district court, with di-
rections to strike from the findings that por-
tion indicated in italics and inserted therein 
on August 26, 1911, to vacate the conclusions 
of law and to modify the same to conform 
to the law herein stated, and to enter judg-
ment dismissing the action, and to appor-
tion the costs as in the judgment of the 
court may be just and equitable. Appellant 
to recover costs in this court. 
McCARTT and STRADP, JJ., concur. 
JOHNSON T. UTAH CONSOL. MINING CO. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. June 7, 1912.) 
MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 221*)—INJURIES TO 
SERVANT —PROMISE TO REPAIR — MASTER'S 
LIABILITY—ASSUMED RISK. 
Where a master has made a promise to 
repair a defect, the master and not the servant 
assumes the risk of injury caused thereby with-
in such time after the promise as would be 
reasonably allowed for performance and within 
a period which would not preclude all reason-
able expectation that the promise might be 
kept 
[Ed. Note.—-For other cases, see Master and 
Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 638-640, £42-645; Dec. 
Dig. J 221.*] 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; M. L. Ritchie, Judge. 
Action by Nels Johnson against the Utah 
Consolidated Mining Company. Judgment 
for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Re-
versed and remanded, with directions. 
Plaintiff brought this action to Tecover 
damages for personal <injuries alleged to 
have been sustained by him on May 28, 1909, 
while employed as a miner in defendant's 
mine in Bingham Canyon, Utah. 
The complaint, in substance, alleges that 
defendant, a corporation, owns and operates 
the Highland Boy Mine in Bingham Can-
yon, Utah; that on the day of the injury 
plaintiff was employed in the capacity of a 
miner and machineman in a certain stope 
on the eight and a half level of the mine; 
that defendant carelessly failed and neglect-
ed to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe 
place in which to perform the work required 
of him under his contract of employment: 
that plaintiff, after he began work, appre-
hended that the earth and rock over the 
point where he was at work was unsound 
and required timbering in order to make the 
place reasonably safe, notified defendant's 
shift boss of the condition, and told him that 
the place needed timbering; that the shift 
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being so, the court should have ordered the 
jury to return a verdict of not guilty on 
account of former jeopardy, and erred in 
not so doing. State v. Gomez, 58 Mont 
177, 190 P. 982. 
The judgment appealed from is reversed 
and the cause remanded with direction to 
dismiss the action. 
JOHNSON, C J., and ERICKSON, 
ANDERSON, and MORRIS, JJ., concur. 
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LADEN et al. v. ATKESON. 
No. 8135. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
June 28, 1941. 
Rehearing Denied Sept 26, 1941. 
1. Easements <S=>I 
Waters and water courses €=>I53 
Generally "easement" is a right which 
one person has to use the land of another 
for a specific purpose or a servitude imposed 
as a burden upon land, as for example, an 
easement in a ditch through the land of an-
other. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Easement". 
2. Easements C=?53 
The right to enter upon servient tene-
ment for purpose of repairing or renewing 
artificial structure, constituting aa. ^ asem^nt, 
is called a "secondary easement", which is a 
mere incident of the easement that passes by 
express or implied grant or is acquired by 
prescription. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Secondary Easement". 
3. Waters and water courses <§=>I56(7) 
A person having an easement in a ditch 
running through the land of another may go 
upon the servient land and use so much 
thereof on either side of the ditch as may be 
required to make all necessary repairs and 
to clean out the ditch at all reasonable times. 
4. Easemeats <§=>50 
Secondary easements can be exercised 
only when necessary and in such a reason-
able manner as not to needlessly increase 
burden on servient tenement. 
5. Easements C=>53 
The owner of dominant estate having 
easement has right to enter on servient es-
tate and make repairs necessary for reason-
able and convenient use of easement, doing 
no unnecessary injury to servient estate. 
6. Easements <S=>40 
Waters and water courses <£> 156(2) 
When the use of a thing is granted, ev-
erything is granted by which grantee may 
reasonably enjoy such use, that is, rights 
that are incident to something else granted, 
such as water and ditch rights. 
7. Waters and water courses ©=3l58|/2(l) 
In suit by owners of a ditch right across 
defendant's lands, to quiet title to easement 
across defendant's lands for purpose of keep-
ing ditch in repair, evidence warranted ac-
tion taken by trial court in decreeing to own-
ers the use of a particular route across de-
fendant's land, on ground that such route 
was usual and customary mode of entering 
defendant's lands for purpose of repair of 
ditch, and was a reasonable route. 
8. Easements @=>53 
An easement for travel across servient 
tenement is a "property right" belonging ex-
clusively to dominant owners, who are re-
sponsible for the necessary upkeep of the 
way in so far as dominant owners' use of 
way is concerned. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Property Right". 
9. Easements e=>49 
Dominant owners liaving easement for 
travel over servient tenement cannot legally 
be permitted to roam all over the servient 
tenement and cannot select a new route of 
travel without consent of owner of servient 
tenement whenever the particular route set 
aside for dominant owners becomes founder-
ous, impassible or merely inconvenient, and 
duty is primarily on dominant owners to re-
pair the route rather than materially devi-
ate therefrom. 
10. Easemeits &»50, 55, 64 
An owner of easement over servient 
tenement mist use easement in such a man-
ner as not to inure the rights of owner nf 
servient tenement, and easement owner ex-
ceeding his rights either in the manner or 
the extent of use, or entering upon or using 
servient tenement for unauthorized purpos-
es, is guilty of a "trespass", and owner of 
servient tenement can maintain action 
against owner of easement, although no actu-
al damages have been sustained by owner of 
servient tenement 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Trespass". 
11. Easements 0 6 4 
An action for damages by owner of 
servient tenement will lie against owner of 
easement on due proof of abuse of easement 
rights. 
12. Waters and water courses €=»l5ftf/2(l) 
A judgment awarding to owners of a 
ditch right across defendant's land, an ease-
ment across defendant's land to keep ditch 
in repair, and designating a described route 
to be used at all times that such route was 
reasonably susceptible of travel, and author-
izing owners to use such other route as 
would afford owners a reasonable and prac-
ticable means of ingress to and egress from 
ditch whenever described route was not rea-
sonably susceptible of travel, did not place 
burden of repair on defendant, but owners 
had duty of repairing described route where 
reasonably practicable. 
13. Waters and water courses G=>t5By2(l) 
Where owners of a ditch right across de-
fendant's land needed dam or other artificial 
structure or device in order to take their wa-
ter from river, owners were properly award-
ed so much of defendant's land at head of 
ditch and along bank of river as might be 
reasonably needed for constructing, main-
taining or repairing dam in river near head 
of ditch, and such award did not give own-
ers unrestricted right to construct dam any-
where in river they might desire. 
14. Waters and water courses <§=>I56(7) 
An owner of easement to maintain dam 
has right to repair breastwork of dam and 
banks at sides of dam, and has right to go 
on land of servient tenement for such pur-
pose, and has further right to restore dam 
that has been carried away by a freshet 
15. Waters and water courses <§=*I56(7) 
In repairing a ditch or water race, own-
er of easement has incidental right to adja-
cent soil of servient tenement if repairs can-
«~* ho made in any other way. 
16. Easements 0 4 7 
A material change of location of ease-
ment cannot be made without consent of 
servient owner, in absence of showing of pre-
scriptive or legal right to change. 
17. Waters and water courses €=>I58'/2(I) 
A judgment properly awarded to per-
sons having a ditch right across defendant's 
land, the use of so much of defendant's land 
on either side of ditch as might be reason-
ably necessary for maintenance and repair 
of ditch, notwithstanding that no absolute 
amount of land on either side of ditch was 
granted. 
Appeal from District Court, Fifth Dis-
trict, Beaverhead County; H. G. Rodgers, 
Judge. 
Suit by Patrick Laden and another 
against Arthur L. Atkeson to quiet title to 
certain alleged easement rights in defend-
ant's lands. From the judgment, the de-
fendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
John Collins, of Dillon, for appellant. 
T. F. McFadden, of Dillon, for respond-
ents, 
ERICKSON, Justice. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of certain agri-
cultural lands in Beaverhead county, and a 
water right appurtenant thereto in the 
Beaverhead river. Water is carried to 
their lands through certain ditches and 
sloughs located on the lands of defendant. 
A dam is maintained near a point in the 
river from which the main diversion ditch 
is taken. To keep the dam and ditches 
leading therefrom in repair, plaintiffs must 
enter upon defendant's lands with dam 
building materials and other paraphernalia 
and vehicles for those purposes. 
It is alleged in the complaint that plain-
tiffs entered upon defendant's lands in fur-
therance of these purposes from March, 
1931, until May, 1937, at which latter time 
defendant instructed plaintiffs to desist and 
refrain from so doing, or persist at their 
own risk. Plaintiffs refrained and there-
after instituted this suit for the purpose of 
quieting title to certain alleged easement 
rights in defendant's lands. They were 
successful before the lower court, sitting 
without a jury, and were adjudged entitled 
to enter defendant's lands over a certain 
described road in order to reach the head 
of their diversion ditch, and also were giv-
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en the use of whatever lands on either side 
of the ditches v.-ere reasonably necessary 
to plaintiffs' repair thereof. The ditch 
right across defendant's lands is not con-
tested. From the judgment and decree de-
fendant brings this appeal. 
The errors assigned complain, in addition 
to the granting cf any right in plaintiffs to 
travel across defendant's lands, of the ex-
tent and general:ty of the court's findings 
and judgment, as follows: "(1) In grant-
ing to plaintiffs the right to travel over de-
fendant's lands 'upon and across said lands 
by such other rcute as will afford them a 
reasonable and practicable means of in-
gress to and egress from the head of their 
said Diversion Ditch under all the condi-
tions then obtaining/ (2) In granting to 
plaintiffs the right to travel at will, across 
appellant's lands 'by such a route as will 
afford them a reasonable and practicable 
means of ingress to and egress * * V 
(3) In awarding to plaintiffs a right not 
only to maintain the dam already con-
structed upon appellant's lands, but also 'to 
use so much and such parts of said lands 
at the head of said Diversion Ditch and 
along the easterly bank of said Beaverhead 
River, as may be reasonably needed and re-
quired for the purpose of constructing a 
dam in said River.' (4) In permitting the 
plaintiffs to deviate from the alleged line of 
travel described b paragraph XVI of the 
Findings whenever that line 'is not reason-
ably susceptible of travel.' (5) The find-
ings do not support the conclusion that a 
right of way for travel across the land of 
defendant was selected and used in such a 
definite way as to impress an easement up-
on that land. (6) The effect of the decree 
is to give to plaintiffs the use of an in-
definite amount of defendant's land, as a 
secondary easement. (7) The evidence is 
not sufficient to warrant the establishment 
of a right of way, of indefinite width, for 
•travel, upon either side of plaintiffs' ditch." 
i.' On the trial of the cause much testimony 
'was introduced relative to the ways by 
which plaintiffs and their predecessors 
passed over defendant's lands in attending 
to the dam and ditches. Whether the 
efforts of counsel were directed toward 
proving or disproving a prescriptive right 
in plaintiffs to cross by a certain prescribed 
route, and the success or otherwise of that 
proof, seems, under the law governing this 
'case, immaterial in view of the court's 
.findings and the evidence adduced in sup-
port thereof. It is sufficient to *av *u~ 
court did not recognize a prescriptive right 
in plaintiffs, but rather "a right in the na-
ture of a secondary easement." 
[1] Generally speaking, "an easement 
has been asserted to be a right which one 
person has to use the land of another for 
a specific pi^pose or a servitude imposed as 
a burden upon land." 17 Am Ju r . sec. 2, p. 
923. For example, an easement in a ditch 
through the land of another. Dahlberg v. 
Lannen, 84 Mont. 68, 274 P. 151. 
[2,3] "The right to enter upon the 
servient tenement for the purpose of re-
pairing or renewing an artificial structure, 
constituting an easement, is called a 'sec-
ondary easement,' a mere incident of the 
easement that passes by express or implied 
grant, or is acquired by prescription." 2 
Thompson en Real Property, p. 343; 19 C. 
J. sec. 208, p. 970; 26 Caljur. p. 163; and 
Jones on Easements, sees. 811 and 812, pp. 
653, 654. To illustrate: "A person having 
an easement in a ditch running through 
the land of another may go upon the servi-
ent land and use so much thereof on either 
side of the ditch as may be required to 
make all necessary repairs and to clean out 
the ditch at all reasonable times." 17 Am. 
Jur. sec. 108, p. 1004; Dahlberg v. Lannen, 
supra; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 
119, 180 P. 67. 
[4,5] Khdred to the above is the 
equally well-established rule that: "Such 
secondary easements can be exercised only 
when necessary and in such a reasonable 
manner as not to needlessly increase the 
burden upon the servient tenement." Jones 
on Easements, sea 811, p. 653; 19 C.J., sec. 
208, p. 970; 2 Thompson on Real Property, 
p. 343. Or, as it is sometimes stated: 
"The owner of a dominant estate having 
an easement has the right to enter upon 
the servient estate and make repairs neces-
sary for the reasonable and convenient use 
of the easement, doing no unnecessary in-
jury to the servient estate." Jones on 
Easements, sec. 814, p. 655; 17 Am.Jur., 
sec. 108, p. 1304. 
[6] These rules are founded on the 
maxim of the law, that when the use of a 
thing is granted, everything is granted by 
which the grantee may reasonably enjoy 
such use, that is, rights that are incident to 
something else granted,—here to water and 
ditch rights. Yellowstone Valley Co. v. 
Associated Mortgage Investors, 88 Mont. 
TX o n n n o r ? ** » ^ — 
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son on Real Property, p. 343; 19 C.J., sec. 
208, p. 970; 26 CaLJur. p. 163. 
[7] With these general rules we agree. 
In reviewing the lower court's findings and 
judgment, under the guidance of these 
rules, the principal question presented, and 
in our opinion determinative of all the is-
sues, is, Does the court's decision, based 
upon the evidence, decree to plaintiffs prac-
tical and reasonable ways of travel upon 
defendant's lands for the necessary mainte-
nance of their irrigation system, inflicting 
no unnecessary injury to such lands or de-
fendant's use thereof? 
From the voluminous record we have 
concluded that possibly more than one 
route, does exist across defendant's lands to 
the head of plaintiffs' diversion ditch. The 
question as to the particular route that will 
result in the minimum of injury to defend-
ant's lands, having in mind his convenience 
in the use thereof, was determined by the 
court to be the precise way alleged to have 
been used by plaintiffs in the matter of at-
tending to their irrigation system upon de-
fendant's lands. The record amply sup-
ports and justifies the action taken by the 
court in decreeing to plaintiffs the use of 
the way just mentioned. Despite any evi-
dence tending to show some deviation from 
the particular line of travel alleged, it is 
significant and compelling in support of 
the court's findings that the way decreed 
to plaintiffs' use constituted the only road-
way across defendant's lands reasonably 
susceptible to their needs and purposes. 
In our opinion, the way decreed to 
plaintiffs for purposes of going to and from 
the head of their diversion ditch constituted 
a reasonable one under the record. There 
is evidence that this particular way, or ap-
proximately so, had been used for a num-
ber of years by plaintiffs and predecessors 
of a much earlier time in the matter of the 
maintenance of the irrigation system in-
volved. It substantially appearing that 
this was the usual and customary mode of 
entering upon defendant's lands for pur-
poses of repair, we are inclined to believe 
that that showing constitutes good evidence 
of the reasonableness of the route used in 
the absence of a showing to the contrary. 
The record does not preponderate with 
evidence of any other route or way de-
signed to accommodate plaintiffs' needs in 
a manner less injurious to defendant's 
*„ j„ +v,o« fit A wav awarded, or one more 
absence of that preponderative showing, 
we have no alternative but to affirm the 
lower court in respect to the route granted. 
In this situation, we think a rehearsal of 
the evidence would serve no useful pur-
pose. 
[8] In paragraph IX of the judgment 
and decree the court recognizes in plaintiffs 
the right to proceed to the head of the 
diversion ditch over the particular road 
described, "at all times the same is reason-
ably susceptible of travel; and if and when 
said roadway is not reasonably susceptible 
of travel, the plaintiffs shall during such 
times pass over, upon and across said lands 
by such other route as will afford them a 
reasonable and practicable means of in-
gress to and egress from the head of their 
said 'Diversion Ditch' under all of the con-
ditions then obtaining/' Defendant com-
plains of this holding because, he asserts, 
it fails to take into account one well-es-
tablished rule relative to secondary ease-
ments, namely, that there is no burden upon 
the servient owner (defendant here) in the 
absence of an agreement, to keep in repair 
for the dominant owners the means neces-
sary to the enjoyment of the primary ease-
ment—here the roadway to the head of the 
diversion ditch. 17 Amjur., sec. 108, p. 
1003, and 19 C.J., sec. 228, p; 980. The 
easement for travel upon defendant's lands 
is a property right belonging exclusively 
to the plaintiffs, the dominant owners (17 
Amjur, sec. 108, p. 1003), and they are 
responsible for the necessary upkeep of the 
way in so far as their own use of it is con-
cerned. 
[9-11] Dominant owners cannot legal-
ly be permitted to roam all over the servi-
ent tenement in cases such as this; nor 
can thej select a new route of travel, with-
out the consent of the servient owner, 
whenever the particular route set aside 
for tha: purpose becomes founderous, im-
passable, or merely inconvenient. The 
duty is primarily upon them, in such in-
stances, to repair their route rather than 
materially deviate therefrom. 17 Am. 
Jur., sec. 88, p. 989. In this regard Corpus 
Juris states the rule to be: "One having 
an easement in another's land is bound to 
use it in such a manner as not to inure 
the rigits of the owner of the servient 
tenement. If the owner of an easement 
exceeds his rights either in the manner or 
the extent of its use, or if he enters upon 
l i t P.2d 881 
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a trespass and the servient owner may 
maintain such action, although no actual 
damages have been sustained by him.'* 
19 CJ., sec. 247, p. 989. In other words, an 
action for damages will lie on due proof of 
abuse of the easement right. Holm v. 
Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403, 44 L.RA^ 
N.S., 89. 
[12] The judgment, we believe, needs 
no modification as to this holding. We do 
not think it may be so broadly interpreted 
as defendant fears. That there may be no 
misunderstanding of it, we have here set 
out the controlling rules with respect to 
the matters covered by finding No. 9. 
Plaintiffs, depending upon the factual sit-
uation, must repair their way where rea-
sonably practicable; otherwise the pos-
sibility would exist of having the burden 
upon the servient tenement needlessly in-
creased contrary to the underlying law of 
all easements. 
[13,14] Complaint as to the court's 
award to plaintiffs of the use of "so much 
and such parts of said lands [of defend-
ant] at the head of said 'Diversion Ditch* 
and along the easterly bank of said Beav-
erhead River, as may be reasonably needed 
and required for the purpose of construct-
ing a dam in said River near the head of 
said 'Diversion Ditch' or for the purpose 
of making any repairs necessary to the 
maintenance of said dam" etc., is without 
merit. As before noted, the ditch right 
in plaintiffs is not contested and it appar-
ently is admitted by all, that in order for 
plaintiffs to take their water from the 
river a dam or some other artificial struc-
ture or device is needed for the purpose. 
Here a dam in the river serves that pur-
pose. In Jones on Easements, sec. 814, p. 
655, the following observation is made in 
that connection: "An easement to main-
tain a dam necessarily involves the right to 
repair it, and this involves also the right 
to go upon the land for that purpose. The 
easement includes not merely the right to 
maintain and repair the breastwork of the 
dam, but also the banks at the sides of it, 
and to go upon the land of the servient 
tenement for that purpose. It also in-
cludes the right to restore a dam that has 
been carried away by a freshet." 
[15] In the same test, sec. 820, p. 659, 
the author recognizes the right to use ad-
jacent soil for purposes of repair in this 
language: "In repairing a ditch or water-
rap** *k~ ~ .«~— -* *« 
incidental right to use the adjacent soil for 
this purpose, in case the repairs cannot be 
made in any other way. The fact that the 
earth so used is the property of the owner 
of the servient tenement does not settle 
the question whether the owner of the 
easement may take it for the purpose of 
making repairs. The owner of the ease-
ment is privileged to repair in all cases 
where the easement cannot be enjoyed 
without repairs; and in making them, he 
may dig up the soil and otherwise use and 
encumber it, doing no more injury than is 
necessary, when such course is indispens-
able to the enjoyment of the easement.'" 
[16] The court's award is "for the pur-
pose of constructing a dam in said River, 
near the head of said 'Diversion Ditch' or 
for the purpose of making any repairs," 
etc. We do not interpert this as being an 
unrestricted award to plaintiffs permitting 
them to construct a dam anywhere in the 
river they may desire, as appellant here 
seems to fear, but rather that plaintiffs are 
granted the right to maintain their dam 
near the head of the diversion ditch. A 
material change of location, of course, 
could not be made without the consent of 
the servient owner, absent a showing of 
prescriptive or other legal right thereto. 
19 C.J., sec. 232, p. 982. 
[17] With respect to the award to plain-
tiffs of the use of so much of defendant's 
lands on either side of their ditches as 
may be reasonably necessary for purposes 
of maintenance and repair, we find no 
fault. What is said above relative to the 
dam is equally applicable to the ditches. 
True, the amount allowed for such pur-
poses is indefinite and uncertain. In the 
very nature of such an easement the extent 
thereof cannot be predetermined with cer-
tainty. It may be that portions of plain-
tiffs' ditches may never need attention oth-
er than casual inspection. Naturally, then, 
little or no land on either side of such por-
tions will be needed for purposes of repair 
or otherwise. Other parts of the system 
nay need constant attention and repair, 
in which event the secondary easement re-
quirements of plaintiffs may be much 
greater. The court's judgment in that in-
stance, as in all others, limits the use by 
plaintiffs to a reasonable amount of de-
fendant's land. That the term "reason-
able" is relative, we concede, but in each 
instance the amount used would constitute 
a question of fact, determination nf
 wVnVVi 
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reasonable usage had been abused. As be-
fore noted, action will lie for such abuse. 
Omniscient or occult indeed would be 
the vision of the court that could foresee 
the precise amounts of land to be needed 
for repairs and maintenance along the 
ditches by plaintiffs in the future. Com-
pare Xeville v. Loudon Irrigating Canal, 
etc., 73 Colo. 548, 242 P. 1002. Had the 
award along either side of the ditches been 
of continuous strips of 10, 15, 20 or any 
other specific number of feet, the court 
might have been subject to the correction 
necessitated in Knudson v. Frost, 56 Colo. 
530, 139 P. 533, 535, where the court in 
condemning such a specific award stated: 
"It will be seen from what has been said 
that the judgment of the court, whether 
based upon the oral agreement or upon 
such rights as follow the written grant, 
and as incident thereto, was erroneous in 
that it granted an absolute easement in two 
strips of land, each 20 feet wide and on 
either side of plaintiffs' ditch. This gives 
the plaintiffs the absolute right to the use 
of all this land at all times and whether 
necessary for the purpose or not, while 
for the purpose of repair they may require 
only the use of defendant's lands for the 
necessary distance on either side of plain-
tiffs' ditch in certain places and at certain 
times; yet it cannot be said that this is 
necessary on all parts of defendant's lands 
along the right of way, nor at all times. 
The right is based upon necessity, and the 
use is confined to the times, places, and 
extent necessary." 
It should be noted that in contrast to 
Knudson v. Frost, supra, the court in the 
present case expressly limited plaintiffs' 
use of defendant's land on either side of 
the ditches to an amount "reasonably 
needed and required for the purposes of 
cleaning or inspecting said ditches, or mak-
ing any repairs thereto necessary to the 
maintenance thereof." By that holding the 
court grounded its judgment on the very 
thing which the court in Knudson v. Frost 
deemed so essential, namely, the necessity 
of the case. No absolute amount is here 
granted, but only a reasonable amount 
which in turn is contingent upon the neces-
sity of entering upon the land for the pur-
poses of maintenance and repair. 
In conclusion we repeat that in the very 
nature of plaintiffs' right to go upon de-
fendant's lands, a secondary easement 
right for the purpose of obtaining full en-
joyment of their primary easement con-
sisting of their ditch right, including the 
dam in the river, they could not be fore-
closed of a reasonable exercise of that 
privilege, nor successfully interfered with 
by injunction or otherwise in the absence 
of a showing of abuse of those rights. 
We have considered all the specifications 
of error, but find no reversible error there-
in. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
JOHNSON, C. J., and ANGSTMAN, 
ANDERSON, and MORRIS, JX, concur. 
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defense to its action based upon breach of 
warranty. After having admitted that evi-
dence, the trial court refused to give to the 
jury any instructions on the law in this 
state on contributory negligence and com-
parative negligence, even though the de-
fendant submitted proposed instructions on 
that subject Both the admission of such 
evidence and the refusal to give such in-
structions are Cambelt's major assign-
ments of error on this appeal. 
We now refuse to consider the propriety 
of the trial court's action, indulging in the 
presumption that the general verdict was 
reached by the jury on the ground that 
there was no construction contract between 
the parties, a defense to which the claimed 
errors do not pertain. As expressed in my 
dissenting opinion in Barson v. Squibb, 
supra, I would not follow such practice in 
our appellate review for the reasons dis-
cussed and based upon the authority cited 
therein. 
For what little consolation it may be to 
Cambelt, if the jury strictly followed the 
instructions given them, any contributory 
negligence or fault of Cambelt should not 
have influenced their verdict. The instruc-
tions made it clear that if they found that 
Cambelt delivered plans and specifications 
to Dalton which were part of the agree-
ment between them, and Dalton failed to 
follow them and thereby constructed a 
faulty and defective platform, they should 
return a verdict in favor of Cambelt. Con-
tributory negligence or fault on the part of 
Cambelt was not mentioned as a factor 
they should consider. 
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Harry THORSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Markay JOHNSON, and Bryce Johnson, 
individually, and Markay Johnson and 
Bryce Johnson, dba Gooseberry Es-
tates, a partnership, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a partnership 
consisting of Tokaco Enterprises (itself 
a family partnership consisting of Wil-
liam T. Gardner and his children Wil-
liam Todd Gardner, Kari Ann Gardner, 
and Corrina Ann Gardner), Latigo, 
Inc., a corporation; Tell W. Gardner; 
Bryce Johnson; Markay Johnson and 
Leonard V. Elfervig, all dba Gooseber-
ry Estates, a Utah Partnership, Plain-
tiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Harry THORSEN and Donald Gates, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18960. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 5, 1987. 
Landowner brought action against 
downstream user for damages to proposed 
real estate development caused when down-
stream user dredged inactive irrigation 
ditch which coursed through development. 
The Sixth District Court, Sevier County, 
Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favor 
of owner. The downstream user appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: 
(1) evidence supported finding that down-
stream user exceeded and abused right to 
enter upon owner's land to clean ditch and 
that he was liable for damages, and (2) 
damages found were based upon erroneous 
measure. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part 
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result 
nn.k A m T *n~j • J j-«-
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1. Waters and Water Courses <s=»247(l) 
Evidence supported finding that down-
stream user of irrigation water exceeded 
and abused his right to enter upon anoth-
er's land to clean irrigation ditch and that 
he was thus liable for damages; dredging 
amounted to substantial widening and 
deepening of ditch whereby large number 
of trees were uprooted and excessive 
amount of earth and rocks excavated. 
2. Damages ®=>138 
Generally measure of damages for in-
jury to real property is difference between 
value of property immediately before and 
immediately after injury. 
3. Waters and Water Courses <s=>247(l) 
Damages to proposed real estate devel-
opment when downstream user dredged in-
active irrigation ditch which coursed 
through development were arrived at based 
upon erroneous measure; there was no evi-
dence supporting trial court's finding that 
lots had a fair market Talue of $6,000 be-
fore ditch was enlarged or that ditch totally 
destroyed land, and expert's appraisal was 
based on assumption that no one had law-
ful irrigation ditch easement through lots, 
which was an erroneous assumption. 
Norman H. Jackson, Richfield, for appel-
lants. 
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for respon-
dents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment in 
favor of Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, 
against Harry Thorsen and Donald Gates 
(hereinafter Thorsen) for damages to a pro-
posed real estate development in Sevier 
County caused when Thorsen dredged an 
inactive irrigation ditch which coursed 
through the development. 
[1] Thorsen was a downstream user of 
the irrigation water and contended that he 
had the right to enter upon Gooseberry's 
property for the lawful pirpose of cleaning 
1. Another measure of damages, discussed in the 
dissent, is the cost of restoring the damaged 
the ditch. Gooseberry contended that the 
ditch had long been abandoned, that anoth-
er ditch had been established in another 
location to carry Thorsen's water, and that 
he did the dredging for the sole purpose of 
preventing the use of Gooseberry's land for 
a planned subdivision to which he, as a 
nearby landowner, was opposed. The case 
was tried before the court without a jury, 
and the trial judge made a personal inspec-
tion of the property. In entering judgment 
in favor of Gooseberry, the trial court 
made findings of fact which are not clear 
as to whether the court found that the 
ditch had been abandoned prior to the 
dredging. However, at the oral argument 
of this case before this Court, counsel for 
Gooseberry admitted that the trial court 
did not find an abandonment and that Thor-
sen had an easement through Gooseberry's 
land for the ditch. 
Nevertheless, in other findings of fact, 
the court found that the dredging by Thor-
sen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of 
the ditch and amounted to a substantial 
widening and deepening of the ditch where-
by a large number of trees were uprooted 
and an excessive amount of earth and 
rocks were excavated Specifically, the 
court found that the ditch "should not have 
been cleaned or dug up in the manner that 
it was and if there had been any right at all 
it would have been merely the right of 
running a plow through the area, the right 
merely to handclean the ditch and it would 
have delivered more water under the cir-
cumstances than it will at the present 
time." The evidence fully supports the 
findings of fact and conclusions of the 
court that Thorsen exceeded and abused 
his right to enter upon Gooseberry's land 
to clean the ditch and that he is liable for 
damages. 
[2,3] Thorsen further contends that the 
damages found against him were excessive 
and based upon an erroneous measure. Al-
though there are exceptions and varia-
tions,1 generally the measure of damages 
498 P.2d 648 (1972), we refused to employ that 
measure of damages where lilacs growing 
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for injury to real property is the difference Gooseberry still owed $16,000 on the pur-
between the value of the property immedi- chase of the property. Gooseberry put on 
ately before and immediately after the inju- testimony that the projected cost of the 
ry (often referred to as the "Diminution in improvements was $171,125, but this did 
Value" rule). Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 
Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972); Brereton 
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967); 
22 AmJur.2d Damages § 132. The trial 
court apparently endeavored to apply this 
measure of damages when it announced: 
The court finds that there were nine lots 
which were totally destroyed, and the 
court sets the value of $6,000 per lot and 
in its present condition and not being 
improved based upon the work up to that 
time; the plaintiffs are awarded a judg-
ment of $54,000. That's based upon 
$6,000 per lot for the nine lots. 
This analysis is flawed in two respects. 
There was no evidence that the "lots" had 
a fair market value of $6,000 before Thor-
sen enlarged the ditch, and there was no 
evidence that the ditch totally destroyed 
nine "lots." The following factual back-
ground is helpful to an understanding of 
why the trial court erred. 
On May 14, 1979, Gooseberry entered 
into a contract with Bryce Johnson to pur-
chase from him 94.47 acres of land for a 
total of $66,750 or $706.57 per acre. John-
son had acquired the 94.47 acres on July 
30, 1978, for the same price. Gooseberry 
contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres of 
that tract into a development of thirty-
three lots, containing 1.53 acres per lot. 
During the seventeen months which 
elapsed from May 14, 1979, when Goose-
berry purchased the land, to October of 
1980, when Thorsen damaged the land, no 
improvements were placed upon the proper-
not include a central sewage system which 
the county kter required. 
The $6,000-per-lot damage found by the 
lower court was apparently based on testi-
mony given by an appraiser, Kenneth Esp-
lin, that if and when the subdivision was 
approved and recorded, water was made 
available, and the improvements were in 
place, the lots should sell for $12,000 each. 
He opined that ten of the proposed lots 
were damaged so as to reduce their poten-
tial value by 50 percent, or to $6,000 each. 
Esplin admitted that he was not very famil-
iar with the narket for mountain lots in 
Sevier County where the property was lo-
cated. He based his opinion on sales made 
in the Cedar City and Fairview areas in 
other counties. Counsel for Thorsen re-
peatedly objected to Esplin's testimony on 
the grounds that it was speculative, conjec-
tural, and irrelevant 
The difficulty with Esplin's testimony, 
and the court's judgment which was based 
upon it, is that at the time Thorsen inflicted 
damage upon the realty, the property was 
in a pristine state exactly the same as when 
it had been purchased seventeen months 
earlier. It is true that Gooseberry had 
expended $15,500 in preparations to im-
prove it with the expectation that some day 
it would become a subdivision of mountain 
lots. However, before this expectation 
could be realized, Gooseberry would have 
to finish paying for the land, develop a 
culinary water supply approved by the 
ty by Gooseberry. A preliminary subdivi- health department, and install a central 
sion plat was prepared, but a final plat had 
not been approved or recorded. Gooseber-
ry expended $8,400 for surveying, map-
ping, and platting. It also expended $7,100 
in an attempt to drill a well to provide 
culinary water for the lots. Adequate wa-
ter was not found. At the time of trial, 
that it would be unreasonable to there employ 
that measure, but recognized that it might be 
reasonable in a case where an ornamental tree 
sewage system. Then, county planning 
and zoning approval of the final plat, to-
gether with approval by the County Com-
mission, would have to be granted. There-
after, financing for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars worth of improvements would 
have to be obtained. When the improve-
sonable since the value of an acre of similar 
land would be SI,250 and restoration costs 
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ments were in place, buyers who were 
ready and willing to pay $12,000 for each 
of the thirty-three lots would have to be 
found. 
In viewing Gooseberry's land as a com-
pleted subdivision, Esplin and the trial 
court lost sight of the fact that the mea-
sure of damages is the diminution of the 
fair market value of the property immedi-
ately following the infliction of the dam-
age—not what the property may be worth 
when and if substantial sums of money are 
expended to turn it into an improved subdi-
vision. In State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 
291 P.2d 1028 (1956), a condemnation case 
in which the jury was instructed to find the 
fair market value of the property, we quot-
ed with approval from Pennsylvania S. V. 
R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 46S 
(1889). 
It is proper to inquire what the tract is 
worth, having in view the purposes for 
which it is best adapted, but it is the 
tract, and not the lots into which it might 
be divided, that is to be valued The 
jury are to value the tract of land and 
that only. They are not to determine 
how it could best be divided into building 
lots, nor conjecture how fast they could 
be sold, nor at what price per lot. A 
speculator or investor, in deciding what 
price he could afford to pay, would con-
sider the chances and probabilities of the 
situation as then actually existing. A 
jury should do the same thing. They are 
not to inquire what a speculator might be 
able to realize out of a resale in the 
future, but what a present purchaser 
would be willing to pay for it in the 
condition it is now in. 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in Department of Highways v. Schul-
hojf, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402, 405 (1968). 
quoted the above passage from Pennsylva-
nia S. V.R. Co. v. Cleary and restated the 
same rule as follows: 
It is proper to show that a particular 
tract of land is suitable and available for 
subdivision into lots and is valuable for 
that purpose. It is not proper, however, 
to show the number and value of lots as 
improper for the jury to consider an un-
developed tract of land as though a sub-
division thereon is an accomplished fact 
Such undeveloped property may not be 
valued on a per lot basis, the cost factor 
clearly being too speculative. 
By fixing the damages based on a complet-
ed, improved subdivision, the trial court 
valued the land before it was damaged at 
$3,921 per acre, whereas it had been pur-
chased seventeen months earlier at $706.57 
per acre. This amounts to a 450 percent 
increase in value—without a single im-
provement to the realty. Significantly, ap-
praiser Esplin testified that the remaining 
43.88 acres of the 94.47 acres purchased by 
Gooseberry (which were not going to be 
subdivided) had a fair market value of 
$1,250 per acre. This was exactly the same 
value per acre ascribed to the entire 94.47-
acre tract by Thorsen's appraiser, Joseph 
S. Stott. Stott belonged to a firm which 
had been marketing real estate in Sevier 
County for seven years. Mountain subdivi-
sion lots had been advertised for sale and 
listed with his agency. However, he testi-
fied, "in the years that I have been in the 
business, we have yet to sell a mountain lot 
out of our office.,, 
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed be-
cause it was based on his assumption that 
no one had a lawful irrigation ditch ease-
ment through the "lots." This was errone-
ous. As previously mentioned, at oral ar-
gument of this case before this Court, 
counsel for Gooseberry Estates admitted 
that the trial court did not find an abandon-
ment and that Thorsen had an easement 
for the irrigation ditch. 
Additionally, while Esplin testified that 
the ditch as enlarged by Thorsen would 
reduce the potential value of any improved 
lot from $12,000 to $6,000, he did not testi-
fy that the value of any of the proposed 
lots was totally destroyed by the enlarged 
ditch. To the contrary, he testified the 
ditch diminished their potential value by 50 
percent. Thus, there is no basis in the 
evidence for the trial court's conclusion 
that the value of the nine lots was totally 
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The remainder of the proposed 1.53-acre 
lots through which the ditch coursed was 
undamaged2 and could be used at a mini-
mum for grazing purposes. The entire 
ditch occupied 1.08 acres (3,150 ft. long X 
15 ft wide). This would be the maximum 
land which could have been ^totally de-
stroyed." It too assumes, contrary to the 
admission of Gooseberry's counsel, that 
Thorsen had no right at all to an easement. 
Since the amount of damages found by 
the trial court was arrived at by an errone-
ous method, we reverse the judgment and 
remand the case to the trial court for reas-
sessment of damages. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, 
Associate CJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
the result): 
I agree with Justice Durham's statement 
of the law of damages. However, I agree 
with the majority that the trial court made 
several unjustified assumptions in fixing 
the amount of damages. Therefore, I join 
the majority in remanding the case for a 
reassessment of damages. In making that 
reassessment, I would hold tha: the trial 
court should be guided by the broader dam-
age principles discussed in Justice Dur-
ham's opinion. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting): 
I join the majority opinion in affirming 
the judgment as to liability, but dissent 
from its treatment of the damage question. 
The measure of damages for permanent 
injury to land and damage to :rees was 
recently treated by the Utah Court of Ap-
peals in Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 
(Utah Ct.App.1987): 
Generally, the measure of damages for 
permanent injury to land is the differ-
ence in the market value of the land 
immediately before and immediately af-
ter the injury, but if the land may be 
restored to its original condition the cost 
of restoration may be used as the mea-
v. JOHNSON Utah 1247 
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sure of damages if it does not exceed the 
diminution in the market value. 
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). The opinion 
correctly notes that the above standard is 
not a rigid one and that "even when dimi-
nution in value is clearly the appropriate 
measure of damages, evidence as to repair 
costs is admissible for the purpose of help-
ing [the fact finder] determine the loss of 
value." Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). 
In Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 
P.2d 3 (1967), this Court endorsed a flexible 
rule particularly applicable for damages to 
land associated with destruction of trees on 
the realty. 
When property has been damaged or 
destroyed by a wrongful act the desired 
objective is to ascertain as accurately as 
possible the amount of money that will 
fairly and adequately compensate the 
owner for his loss. 
Because of the fact that any attempt 
at unvarying uniformity in applying ei-
ther [the diminution in value rule or the 
separate value rule], a third rule, which 
we believe to be the better considered 
and more practical one, has been applied. 
It gives the injured party the benefit of 
whichever of the two rules will best 
serve the objective hereinabove stated of 
giving him reasonable and adequate com-
pensation for his actual loss as related to 
his use of his property If he wants 
to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood lot, 
or even a primitive area, though his prop-
erty may be more valuable if turned to 
an industrial or residential purpose, that 
should be his prerogative; and if it is 
wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the 
wrongdoer should pay for the actual 
damage he caused. 
Id. at 66, 67-68, 433 P.2d at 5-6. 
A few years later, in Pehrson v. Sader-
up, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), this 
Court quoted with approval the following 
language from Thatcher v. Lane Con-
struction Co., 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 254 N.E. 
2d 703 (1970): 
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Where the presence of trees is essen-
tial to the planned use of property for a 
homesite in accordance with the taste 
and wishes of its owner, where not un-
reasonable and where such trees are de-
stroyed by trespassers, the owner may 
be awarded as damages the fair cost of 
restoring his land to a reasonable ap-
proximation of its former condition, if 
such restoration be practical, without 
necessary limitation to diminution in mar-
ket value of such land. 
28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 P.2d at 650 (citing 
Thatcher, 21 Ohio App.2d at 49, 254 N.E.2d 
at 708). The Pehrson opinion goes on to 
state what I believe to be a sound and just 
rule: "In a determination of the appropri-
ate measure of damages in this area, the 
cardinal principles are flexibility of ap-
proach and full compensation to the owner, 
within the overall limitation of reasonable-
ness." Pehrson, 28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 
P.2d at 650. 
The trial court in this case found as fact 
that defendant Thorsen "willfully and in-
tentionally . . . [made] a massive, senseless, 
purposeless ditch across [plaintiffs'] prem-
ises." A review of the numerous photo-
graphs in the record explains the finding 
that the trial judge, after personal inspec-
tion of the land, was "shocked at the dam-
age which was done to the premises . . . 
and [had] grave doubts whether or not the 
property . . . can ever be used for the pur-
poses for which they [sic] were bought by 
the Plaintiffs." The evidence showed that 
more than two hundred mature pine trees 
and one hundred and seventy cedars over 
eight feet tall were uprooted by defendant. 
Plaintiffs' experts testified that replacing 
them would cost approximately $275 per 
tree and that the trees on the lots were 
extremely important to the development 
and sale of the lots. Other testimony es-
tablished that many lots would not even be 
saleable without grading and reseeding at 
a cost of $80,000 without replacing any 
trees. In short, although disputed, there 
was considerable evidence upon which the 
trial court could rely in awarding $54,000. 
In view of the malice that motivated this 
took in applying the diminution in value 
rule. In fact, I think he would have beea 
justified in using the restoration costs, 
within some reasonable limit, as a measure 
of damages. Fifty-four thousand dollars, 
as compared to the cost of replacing the 
destroyed trees (more than $100,000) seems 
very reasonable to me. The majority's ap-
proach is, I believe, contrary to our case 
law supporting the principle of full compen-
sation within the overall limitation of rea-
sonableness. 
Finally, I note that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-38-3 (1987), upon which plaintiffs ap-
parently did not rely, provides for the tre-
bling of civil damages against "any person 
who cuts down . . . or otherwise injures 
any tree . . . on the land of another person 
. . . without lawful authority." 
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Karla KISHPAUGH (Kornmayer), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Bruce KISHPAUGH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20423. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1987. 
Natural father filed petition to modify 
divorce decree to change custody. Mater-
nal grandparents filed petition to obtain 
guardianship over child. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
J.> awarded custody to grandparents. Fa-
ther appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that: (1) presumption fa-
voring custody by natural parent was 
rebutted and trial court was permitted to 
base custody award solely on its determina-
tion of the child's best interests once it 
found that all three requirements for rebut-
ADDENDUM "E" 
652 209 FEDEELAL SUPPLEMENT 
'u iNHMlTf lW) 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
S.08 ACBES OF LAND, MORE OB LESS, 
Situated IN BOX ELDEB COUNTY, 
Utah, Utah Power and Light Company, 
et aL, and Unknown Others* Defend* 
ants. 
No. C129-4L 
United States District Court 
D. Utah, N. D. 
Sept 13, 1962. 
Action by government to condemn 
a right of way for a canal across realty 
owned by utility company. The District 
Court, Christensen, J., held that right to 
maintain and operate a 50-foot boom on 
top of banks of the canal for cleaning 
canal was a part of the right of way 
easement reserved by operation of orig-
inal grant of a right of way for construc-
tion of a canal by United States govern-
ment over land and exercise of such right 
would not result in an additional taking 
which would have to be condemned 
Decree accordingly. 
L Waters and Water Courses S=»22S 
Under Utah statute granting over 
all lands owned by the State a right of 
way for ditches constructed by the United 
States and requiring that all subsequent 
conveyances of Stats lands 
reservation of such right of Way, ] 
ment had an existing right of 
establish and maintain * -caMl? 
land which State had su 
veyed under a patent stating 
veyance was subject to any rif 
which might have been estabt 
quired according to law and i 
rights of way for ditches thai] 
constructed by the United St 
1953,65-2-3. •#£+-. 
2. Public Lands *=m*(l) ' 
In construing effect of* 
grant, the law in force at t i n * , 
is made controls, f *in* && 
S. Public Lands *=>114(1) 
The world at large is 
notice of a conveyance and 11 
established by statute! and* 
a patent directly contrary to 
law is void to the extent of sockj 
L Evidence **5(«)
 t ^ 
Court may take judicial 
canals in addition to having 
sides frequently have banks. 
5. Waters and Water Courses' 
Construction and maint 
eight-foot banks along canal were ] 
ably necessary to carry out aut 
purposes of canal and were within 
of easement that had been reserved A 
construction of canaL' 
& Eminent Domain €=*9S 
Enlargement of easement cannot I 
considered as causing mere consequent! 
damage not incidental to an actual takft 
for which no recovery can be had. 
7. Eminent Domain <*=>2<10) 
Waters and Water Courses 4=*222 
Right to maintain and operate 
50-foot boom on top of banks of cam 
for cleaning canal was a part of right <i 
way easement reserved by operation <J 
original grant of a right of way for crij 
struction of a canal by United Statd 
government over land and exercise q 
such right would not result in an add 
tional taking which would have to t 
condemned. U.C.A.195S, 65-2-8. '4 
UNITED 8TATES T. 106 AOBES OF LAND, ETC 
CiUs • • 306 F Jopp. 432 (1MB) 
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an easement holder may not 
the servitude upon the grantor's 
by enlarging on the easement 
is entitled to do what is reason-
for full and proper enjoy-
of rights granted under the ease-
in the normal development of the 
'the dominant tenement. 
t T. Thurman, U. S. Atty., Craig 
at, Asst U. S. Atty., Salt Lake 
*ier plaintiff. 
J. Bertoch, Sidney G. Baucom, 
> City, for defendants. 
ISTENSEN, District Judge. 
\ is an action brought by the United 
ltd America as plaintiff to condemn 
of way across a parcel of real 
owned by the defendant Utah 
and Light Company for the pur-
fif constructing a canal. 
use for which the real property 
it be taken is stated in the complaint 
I a public use in connection with the 
ion. operation and maintenance 
STHllard Canal, Weber Basin Proj-
The estate to be taken accord-
["to the complaint is a right of way 
<jbe r^ afrr -if -wag ^ 
• K ' M I I rii i s a 
*f land 185 feet wide, containing 3.08 
acres more or less, situated in Box Elder 
fumnty, State of Utah. Subsequent pro-
ceedings have indicated that the Govern-
•aent believes that it is already entitle 
*V the right of way sought to be con* 
^tanned by virtue of a prior reservation, 
as will be discussed more fully hereafter. 
Nibbley on May 29 1917; that said land 
has by mesne conveyances become the 
property of the defendant Utah Power 
and Light Company; and that the plain-
tiff already has the granted and reserved 
right to construct a canal across said 
land without paying the defendant more 
than nominal compensation, estimated in 
the declaration of taking to be One Dol-
lar. 
The defendant Utah Power and Light 
Company does not contest the right of the 
plaintiff to condemn a right of way in the 
property in question but claims that it 
is entitled to fair and just compensation 
for the interest taken in the amount of 
$350.00 per acre for the 8.08 acres, or 
$1078.00, plus further compensation for 
damages to its remaining interest in the 
property taken and for consequential 
damage to the remaining portion of the 
parcel of land involved or to the entire 
generating or distributing system of 
which the property taken is an integrated 
part, in the amount of $18,900.00. The 
Power Company asserts that the parcel 
of land of which the condemned portion 
is a part was acquired by it for use as a 
site for. towers to support high tension 
wires to be integrated with its generat-
ing and distriboting system; that the 
Actually it appears that the Government 
rii seeking to condemn only any enlarge-
ment of the claimed existing easement 
4hat may be found to result from its con-
rtsmplated use. 
* The plaintiff claims that the property 
in question was acquired by the State of 
Utah from the United States by a selec-
tion list transfer approved by the United 
States Department of the Interior on 
June 19,1907; that said land was patent-
id by the State of Utah to Charles W. 
ing by Hie government, but that due to 
the canal banks to be constructed on the 
condemned property and the boom neces-
sarily to be used on those canal banks for 
maintenance of the canal, the Utah Power 
and Light Company has had to redesign 
its towers to increase their heights so 
that the power lines suspended between 
them and over the canal will be at a 
height required by law to avoid contact 
with plaintiff's equipment. It is alleged 
that the increased cost of the construc-
tion of the higher towers compared with 
those originally designed will amount to 
$11,900.00. It is further contended that 
the defendant Power Company will have 
to bear $7,000.00 as additional cost to 
strengthen a bridge which will accommo-
date the heavy equipment necessary to 
the defendant's operations, since direct 
0C4 guv xxujjtauuj PU^jfliKMKKX 
access by such heavy equipment without 
the strengthened bridge will be cut off 
by the proposed canal. 
All of the other parties defendant have 
either disclaimed or defaulted. The fol-
lowing facts have been stipulated be-
tween the plaintiff and the Utah Power 
and Light Company: 
The canal in question will have a maxi-
mum water gravity flow capacity of 950 
cubic, feet per second and a maximum 
flow capacity of 500 cubic feet per second 
with a bottom width of SO feet and a 
maximum water surface width of 70 feet. 
It will be 90 feet wide inside the top of 
the embankments and will have an over-
all width from embankment toe to em-
bankment toe of approximately 180 feet 
where it crosses the property of the 
Power Company. Drains and ditches will 
be constructed alongside the canal wher-
ever necessary to carry off surface water. 
The earth embankments along the sides 
of the canal will have an average height 
of 8 feet above the average ground level 
of the said defendant's property. The 
fair market value of the interest in the 
land itself, as taken by the plaintiff in 
this action, is $350.00 per acre. 
The sole contested issue of fact as re-
served in the pre-trial order in the words, 
of the parties is: 
"What is the amount of the con-
sequential damage done to defend-
ants' remaining interest in the prop-
erty taken for the easement and to 
the remaining portion of the parcel 
of property out of which the ease-
ment is carved, or to the remainder 
of the integrated power system. To 
approach it another way, what is 
the amount of expense necessary to 
enable the defendant to make its re-
maining land and its remaining in-
terest in the land taken usable to the 
extent and for the same purpose it 
was used or to be used prior to the 
taking. To express the measure-
ment of damage in still a third al-
ternative manner: Has the market 
value of the entire power system of 
the defendant been reduced in value 
by the taking, and if so, to what *Mr 
tent" 
The parties expressed in the p: 
order the contested issues of law, in 
dition to those implicit in the foregi 
issue of fact, as: - ^ 
"(a) Whether or not plaintiff haa | | 
the reserved right to construct t h e | | 
ditch known as the 'Weber CanaF^ 
across such real property with re j^jjj 
spect to any and all of the acreage1, 
classifications * * # by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Utah with 
out paying defendant Utah Power 
and Light Company more than nom» V 
inal compensation and '•%; 
"(b) Whether or not defendant ~ 
Utah Power and Light Company it 
entitled to compensation for tlye al-
leged consequential damage, or cost" 
of restoration, or reduction of mar» 
*et value, ll you will, described 
above." 
This case is perhaps the only contested} 
civil case in recent years in which I havil 
been persuaded by counsel not to hold M J 
actual pre-trial conference. Counsel i a | | 
dicated a reluctance to go to the troul 
of appearing in the Northern DiviaJ< 
for the conference and indicated that 
issues were simple and the evidence 
be substantially stipulated. I theref* 
signed a stipulated "Pre-Trial Or< 
without holding an actual pre-trial 
ference. Developments have indica 
that even in the seemingly simple case**' 
actual pre-trial conferences are bene-
ficial and that rarely, if ever, can time^ 
be saved or the interest of justice proK 
moted by dispensing with them. %* 
Implicit In the pre-trial order Is the 
indication that defendant Power Com-
pany did not contest the necessity for the! 
"taking" and that the only issue of ulti-
mate fact involved damages. Both par* 
ties, at the time the execution of the 
pre-trial order was under consideration 
and at the time of the trial, indicated 
that the damages to the Utah Power and 
Light Company were occasioned, aside 
from the value of any interest in land 
actually taken, by the eight foot banks of 
f4 
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t^he canal and by the plan and necessity 
of the government to operate from those 
fbanks a 60 foot boom for the purpose of 
'cleaning the canal. This combination, 
j^ the evidence established, necessitated the 
raising, as compared with their accept-
able height, of the planned towers sup-
porting the Power Company's transmis-
sion lines which would not be necessary 
were it not for the elevated banks and 
the necessary boom, and which raising 
entailed additional expense to the Power 
Company of $11,900.00. 
The court finds in the latter connection 
that the defendant's increased cost of 
construction of electrical facilities neces-
sitated by plaintiff's contemplated use of 
the land taken, including the utilization 
of the boom for maintenance of the canal, 
will be the sum of $11,900.00; that by 
reason of the establishment of the canal 
defendant's access to its remaining prop-
erty by its necessary heavy equipment 
will be destroyed unless the said defend-
ant incurs an additional cost of $7,000.00 
in supporting a public bridge designed, 
"without such support, for merely ordi-
nary vehicular traffic; and that by these 
amounts the value of the defendant's in-
tegrated power system may fairly be re-
garded as depreciated by the taking. 
These findings will become important 
only if I am wrong in some or all of. my 
other findings or conclusions. 
Neither the pre-trial order nor the 
evidence adduced at the trial indicated 
what part of this expense or depreciation 
would be due to the maintenance of the 
elevated banks of the canal and what ad-
ditional part, if any, would be attributa-
ble to the contemplated operation by the 
Government of the 60 foot boom in con-
nection with the maintenance of the 
canal While the Government itself ac-
cepted, during the course of the trial, the 
thesis that this proceeding was designed 
to assure to it the right to operate such 
boom and that it would be necessary for 
the Power Company to raise its transmis-
sion lines to permit such operation, there 
was no specification in the pre-trial order, 
aor in notice of taking, that this opera-
tion was included as among the rights 
sought to be condemned or confirmed in 
the Government The significance of this 
refinement became apparent only from 
the briefs filed following the trial, which 
briefs changed the original emphasis up-
on the question of whether the Govern-
ment already had a right of way for the 
maintenance of a canal across plaintiff's 
land to one of whether, even though some 
right of way existed, it included the right 
to maintain eight foot banks along the 
canal and the use of the boom in con-
nection with the maintenance of the 
canal. 
The Government now maintains that 
the question of the enlargement of a 
right was not involved in the issues re-
served in the pre-trial order and thus 
should not be considered while the de-
fendant Power Company points out that 
the question of enlargement directly re-
lates to the amount of damages to which 
the Power Company is entitled within 
the purview of the question of damages 
expressly reserved in the pre-trial order. 
I must obsenre, too, that the government 
hardly can contend that this is only a 
suit for a declaration that whatever 
rights it seek* are included in an existing 
reserved right of way when it has seen 
fit not simply to ask for such a declara-
tion, but to ask that any and all interests 
of the defendant Power Company in the 
land described be condemned for the pur-
pose of permitting the Government to es-
tablish and maintain the canal by means 
of all necessary structures and equip-
ment. 
[1] In 1905 the Legislature of the 
State of Utah enacted the following stat-
ute, now 65-2-3 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, which reads as follows: 
"There is hereby granted over all 
lands now or hereafter belonging 
to the state of Utah a right of way 
for ditches, tunnels, telephone and 
transmission lines, constructed by 
authority of the United States. All 
conveyances of state lands hereafter 
made shall contain a reservation of 
such right of way." 
In 1907, after the enactment of this 
statute, the State of Utah acquired the 
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land in question from the United States 
Government In 1917 it was sold by the 
State under patent to George W. Nibbley. 
The grant in the patent contained the 
following provision: 
"Subject to any easement or right 
of way as may have been established 
or acquired according to law, over 
the same or any part thereof and 
subject also to all rights of way for 
ditches, tunnels and telephone and 
transmission lines that may have 
been constructed by authority of the 
United States." 
The defendant contended at the time 
of the trial that the effect of the patent 
was to limit the reserved right of way 
to easements established and perfected 
while title to the property was still in 
the State. There seems little doubt that 
if the wording of the patent is accepted 
at face value this might be the effect. 
The defendant further contended that in-
dependent of the wording of the patent 
itself, the State statute would have the 
same effect On the latter point it cited 
United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 603 
(10 Cir. 1949), interpreting a similar 
Oklahoma statute. 
Recognizing the significant difference 
between the wording of the patent and 
the statute, and in harmony with the 
views I expressed at the trial, I am of the 
opinion that not the Pruden case but Ide 
v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 44 S.Ct . 
182, 68 L.Ed. 407 (1924) controls the 
resolution of this question for the follow-
ing reasons: The Pruden decision was an 
interpretation of the Oklahoma statute 
which was in part at least based upon 
Oklahoma decisions of which there are no 
counterparts among the Utah adjudica-
tions. But more important, primary re-
liance was placed in Pruden upon the in-
terpretation of the Federal statute gov-
erning the reservation of rights of way 
for highway purposes, whereas, as point-
ed out in Ide, there is a directly analogous 
Federal statute dealing with canals, on 
the very language of which the Utah 
statute is based, and which Ide inter-
prets directly contrary to the conclusion 
reached in Pruden. 
I see no escape from the controlliqjl 
effect of the Ide doctrine which u*t«rf 
preted the very statute which Utah use| l 
as the model for its own statute witH 
reference to the reservation of a right ora 
way for canals. See also Northern Pail 
cific Railway Company v. United StateeJ 
277 F.2d 615 (10 Cir. 1960); Green ia 
Willhite, 160 F. 755 (Cir.C.DJdahel 
1906); United States v. Andersoaa 
109 F;Supp. 755 (D.C.E.D.Wash.l958>jj 
United States v. Fuller, 20 F.Supp. 8SW 
(D.C.Idaho 1937); Dopps v. Alderman^ 
12 Wash.2d 268, 121 P.2d 388 (1942^M 
Nor does the fact that the patent Jjn 
question uses language indicating a <ftJKl 
ferent interpretation change the effecjS 
of the statute, whether this circumstasRJS 
be looked upon as one relating to the teM 
islative history of the statute to be lookm 
to in its interpretation or as an argument! 
that the form of the patent could override? 
the law itself. On the former subject^ 
the evidence indicated that while thian 
particular form of the patent was utilised,] 
in 1917, thereafter the State Land Boah^ 
changed the form of similar patents tfl 
conform to the wording of the statuw 
rather than to indicate that the rights 
of way reserved applied only to canab^ 
that had been constructed theretofore*! 
It is more reasonable to suppose that the* 
Land Board discovered the invalidity <ra 
the wording of the patent in question^ 
and changed other patents to confora^J 
with the controlling law than to suppose^ 
that the Legislature of the State of UtaK • 
by failing to pass a law correcting thej 
form of the patent in question put its^ 
implied stamp of approval upon the io-^ 
terpretation of the Land Board. In view \ 
of this evidence' the case of State T.:. 
Hatch, 9 Utah 2d 288, 342 P.2d UQ$| 
(1959), so strongly relied upon by thrj 
Power Company loses point 
[2,3] In any event it is well settled* 
that in construing the effect of a public* 
grant such as a patent the law in fort* 
at the time the grant is made controls*: 
The world at large is charged with notice: 
of a conveyance and its limitations estab* 
lished by a statute, and a provision in % 
patent directly contrary to governing law 
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J*all. 525, 
I<1865); 
e* void to the extent of such conflict 
^Gieason v. White, 199 U.S. 64, 26 S.Ct 
| » 2 , 60 L.E& 87 (1905); Morris v. 
fUnited States, 174 U.S. 196,19 S.Ct. 649, 
?43 L.Ed. 946 (1899); Burfenning v. 
^Chicago S t P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 
*ttl, 16 S.Ct. 1018, 41 L.Ed. 176 (1896); 
IXnight v. United Land Ass'n., 142 U.S. 
$W, 12 S.Ct 258, 35 L.Ed. 974 (1891); 
flron Silver Min. Co. v. Campbell, 135 
rU.S. 286, 10 S.Ct 765, 34 L.Ed. 155 
I (1890); Glasgow v. Baker, 128 U.S. 660, 
J18.Ct 154, 82 L.Ed. 513 (1888); Coffee 
£jr. Groover, 123 U.S. 1,8 S.Ct 1, 31 L.Ed. 
Tfl (1887); United States v. Stone, 2 
69 U.S. 625, 17 L.Ed. 765 
Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. 
§«4, 43 U.S. 284, 11 L.Ed. 269 (1844); 
f The Mayor, etc. of New Orleans v. De 
|Armas and Cucullo, 9 Pet 224, 11 Curt. 
138, 34 U.S. 224, 9 L.Ed. 109 (1835); 
f Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch 87, 13 
%V&. 87, 8 L.Ed. 665 (1815); United 
i 8tates v. State of Washington, 233 F.2d 
[ t i l (9 Cir. 1956). See also Burke v. 
[Southern P. R. Co. 234 U.S. 669, 34 
|&Ct 907, 58 L.Ed. 1527 (1914); United 
^States v. Fuller, 20 F.Supp. 839 (D.C. 
(Idaho, 1937) ; Walpole v. State Board of 
£Land Com'rs., 62 Colo. 554, 163 P. 848 
[(1917). 
f I conclude that the Government with-
' eat reference to the condemnation pro-
ceedings had, and has, an existing right 
of way to establish and maintain the 
canal in question together with all *p-
: purtenances reasonably necessary for 
i such canals. 
r This brings us to the point which was 
imot defined in the pre-trial order but 
. which lurks within the issues specified 
* and which now has been urged by the 
defendant Power Company, i. e. that even 
though a right of way for the mainte-
nance of a canal exists, the elevation of 
the banks to eight feet and the mainte-
nance and operation of the boom neces-
sitating the raising of the transmission 
lines of the Power Company constitute 
an enlargement of that right, which en-
largement must be condemned and for 
which compensation must be paid. 
tOt F.Supp --42 
[4,5] I think it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge of which the court may 
take judicial notice, that canals in addi-
tion to bottoms and sides frequently, if 
not invariably, have banks. It is reason-
able to suppose that the Legislature in 
making provision for a reservation of 
rights of way for canals contemplated 
that the easement so reserved would be 
for the purpose of constructing and main-
taining banks of canals, among other 
things. In this mountainous region 
where hydraulic gradient must be main-
tained over irregular terrain it may not 
be supposed that the maintenance of 
canals without banks necessarily was con-
templated. On the contrary, not only 
may banks of some sort be deemed rea-
sonably necessary to the enjoyment of 
the easement reserved in favor of the 
Government, but we must accept them as 
within the contemplation of the statutes 
reserving the easement 
If the easement reserved includes the 
right to maintain canal banks, I cannot 
find that their construction and mainte-
nance to a maximum of eight feet above 
the natural terrain in the area in question 
would be unreasonable. If banks can be 
maintained above the natural terrain to 
any degree within the contemplation of 
the easement, I would think that they 
could be maintained to the above extent, 
depending upon the reasonable neces-
sities as determined by reclamation offi-
cials. The pre-trial stipulation and order 
accept the necessity for the contemplated 
construction, including the banks. There 
is no evidence or agreements from which 
I could find that the construction and 
maintenance of the eight foot banks are 
beyond the scope of the easement, and I 
find that they are reasonably necessary 
to carry out the authorized purposes of 
the canal. 
Whether the same can be said about 
the right to maintain and operate a fifty 
foot boom on the top of the banks is a 
more difficult question. But before deal-
ing further with this question two pre-
liminary points raised by the Govern-
ment should be considered. 
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Consideration of the issue of enlarge-
ment of the heretofore reserved right of 
way is not precluded by the pre-trial or-
der. While the matter of enlargement 
was not specifically mentioned at the trial 
the pre-trial order stipulated by the par-
ties did reserve the question of damages 
for any taking. The defendant would not 
be precluded from rightfully claiming 
damages for a portion of the interest 
actually taken although it had asserted 
without warrant a right to recover dam-
ages for the whole. If the construction 
of the canal with ordinary banks and 
appurtenances would not amount to a 
taking, the maintenance and operation of 
the fifty foot boom might; and, if it did, 
the question of damages for the taking 
of an easement to operate the boom would 
be within the purview of the pre-trial 
order. The very fact that this case start-
ed out and still continues on the face of 
the complaint as a pure and simple action 
to condemn a right of way without refer-
ence to any prior rights now claimed by 
the Government does not put the latter 
in a very good position now to be tech-
nical in excluding from consideration a 
resolution of all of the issues necessarily 
implied by the subsequent positions of 
each party as acquiesced in by the other. 
[6] Nor do I think the position of 
the Government is correct that damages 
otherwise recoverable for an easement to 
operate the boom would amount merely to 
consequential damages for which the de-
fendant Power Company could not re-
cover for the latter reason. It is true, 
that a firm Federal rule denies recovery 
of consequential damages unless they are 
incidental to an actual taking. United 
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 
U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101 
(1945); Northern Trans, Co. v. Chicago* 
99 U.S. 635,25 L.Ed. 336 (1879); Batten 
et aL v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10 
Cir. 1962); Harris v. United States, 205 
F.2d 765 (10 Cir. 1953). Apart from the 
question of whether there already exists 
a right of way in favor of the Govern-
ment for the purpose, the very statement 
of the rule and the latest expression of 
our Circuit Court in the Batten case 
make clear that the claimed enlargement 
could not be considered as causing n « f 
consequential damage not incidental ^ 
an actual taking. In Batten, recoveq^ 
was denied because there was not a phyw 
icalM invasion of the air space over Hfcl 
claimant's land and no related taking i l 
the view of the majority of the court; 
but over the dissent of Judge Murrak 
Compare United States v. Causby, 321 
U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 
(1946), where there was an actual h 
sion of the air space above the claimant 
land by low flying aircraft and, hence, 
compensable taking and a recovery 
consequential damages. ^ 
[7] - If it does not already have 
right, the Government really is aakix^ 
now for an easement to make an extiV 
ordinary use of the air space above th# 
canal for the operation of the fifty foot 
boom. This in substance was the stat*» 
ment that the Government attorney 
firmed at the last hearing. If it ne 
an easement I suppose that no one' 
assert that the Government should 
pay for i t It would seem to make net 
difference, in principle that the additions 
easement sought to be obtained extendi 
vertically above the banks of the canal 
if indeed it is an additional easeme 
that must be condemned. But is it? 
There is a suggestion in the evidc 
that there may be new types of equij£J 
ment which could be constructed and 
erated without entailing the necessity o£ 
raising the defendants' lines or that 
dredging equipment might be employed^ 
The preponderance of the evidence, howH 
ever, indicates, and I find, that upon the? 
basis of equipment in existence the only; 
practical way that the canal can be clean-
ed at present, and certainly the normal; 
and reasonable means under current con-
ditions, is to utilize a fifty foot boom with 
dragline, the banks of the canal at the 
water line being some seventy to ninety; 
feet apart, and it being impracticable 
because of the construction of the canal 
and the necessity of maintaining water in 
it almost all of the time to move equip* 
ment into the bottom. 
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v. I further find for completion of the 
•record in the event of appeal that in prder 
Ao construct its transmission lines at a 
height sufficient to permit the operation 
-of such a boom the defendant necessarily 
will incur expenses of $8707.00 more than 
would be necessary if the transmission 
lines were elevated and constructed to 
adjust simply to the extra height of the 
eight foot banks with requisite safety 
margin. Such finding, however, is not 
essential to a disposition of the case if 
zmy decision stands. 
Not without some doubt, I have con-
eluded, and find, that right to maintain 
such a canal in this ordinary and reason-
able fashion, including the operation of 
the fifty foot boom under existing condi-
tions, is a part of the right and easement 
reserved by operation of the original 
grant and subsequent conveyances and 
the reservation incorporated therein un-
der the law. 
It must be acknowledged that at the 
time of the original reservation such 
equipment as a fifty foot boom and drag-
line for the purpose of cleaning canals 
was not a usual thing, and may not even 
have been in use at all. Such an opera-
tion was not one that could be deemed un-
contemplated in principle. As a matter 
of fact, a one hundred foot wide canal 
probably was not ordinary construction 
in those days. It probably was not con* 
templated that such a canal as the one 
in question here would run water both 
ways—in the summer by means of pump-
ing from the canal and during the non-
irrigation seasons into the canal. But 
if we must limit construction or mainte-
nance within the protection of the ease-
ment to exactly what was well known or 
practiced then, the basically continuing 
purpose of the reservation would be 
frustrated. 
[8] The right reasonably to main-
tain such a canal, including the right to 
operate the fifty foot boom if reasonably 
necessary under existing conditions, 
must be considered to be included in the 
reserved easement. The general rule is 
that while an easement holder may not 
increase the servitude upon the grantor's 
property by enlarging on the easement 
itself, it is entitled to do what is reason-
ably necessary for full and proper enjoy-
ment of the rights granted under the 
e&sement in the normal development of 
the use of the dominant tenement. Ko-
god v. Cogito, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 
2M F.2d 743 (1952); Pitsenbarger v. 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F.Supp. 
665 (D.C.S.D.Iowa 1961); Williams v. 
Northern Natural Gas Company, 136 F. 
Supp. 514, (D.CN.D.Iowa 1955) App. 
Dis., 8 Cir., 235 F.2d 782; Laden v. At-
keson, 112 Mont 302, 116 P.2d 881 
(1941); Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 
125 P. 403, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 89 (1912); 
17A AmJur. Easements § 129 pp. 737-
739; 5 Restatement, Property, § 484 
(1944) p. 3020; cf. Stalcup v. Cameron 
Ditch Company, 130 Mont. 294, 300 P.2d 
511 (1956). 
The last line of inquiry at the last 
hearing, which was not discussed in 
counsels9 statements, presents a final 
problem that at least must be noted. 
In response to a question by the court, 
a witness for the Government testified 
that the canal in his judgment would 
have to be cleaned about every ten years. 
Assuming that construction is not now 
complete, then, it may be more than ten 
years before there will be any occasion 
to use the boom. While I have found 
with some assurance that the use of that 
boom would be reasonably necessary to 
clean the canal if it had to be cleaned un-
der existing conditions, what the situa-
tion will be ten or fifteen years hence in 
view of the prospective changes in equip-
ment and procedures as suggested by the 
evidence is somewhat uncertain. 
The Government insists that it need 
not pay for any additional right to op-
erate the boom. If it thus relies exclu-
sively upon the existing easement, rather 
than condemnation, it is under continu-
ing obligation to avoid unnecessary in-
jury to the servient estate. Brown & 
Root, Inc. v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 
732. 126 Ct.Cl. 684 (1953); Laden v. 
AUcison, 112 Mont 802, 116 P.2d 881 
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(1941); Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200,125 
P. 403, 44 LR.A.fN.S., 89 (1912); 17A 
Am.Jur. Easements § 130 p. 739. And it 
is entirely possible that the use of the 
boom ten or fifteen years hence will need-
lessly inflict injury upon the Power Com-
pany. 
Should I accede to the Government's 
insistence that I recognize its claimed 
rights without making an award on the 
theory that an additional easement to 
operate the boom is sought, it necessarily 
would be, it seems, the confirmation of 
the right to operate the boom under exist-
ing conditions, not precluding a later 
claim under changed conditions that its 
operation then would be the subjugation 
of the servient estate to unnecessary in-
jury and thus an enlargement of the 
existing easement On the other hand, 
the dilemma of the Power Company too 
is perplexing for it must determine the 
height of its lines in the near future to 
permit early installation; and if it doea 
not adjust its construction program to 
the possibility that the operation of the 
boom in the future will continue a reason-
ably necessary exercise of the existing 
easement of the Government, it will be 
proceeding at its peril. 
Having already permitted the parties 
to reopen once, I fear that there still is 
insufficient evidence, or even specific is-
sues reflected in the pleadings or pre-
trial order before me, to make possible a 
solution of this refined dilemma. It may 
be that by their respective positions, and 
the implied mues acquiesced in, the par-
ties may be confronted unavoidably with 
the problem as a part of the practical 
context of the case. Perhaps it is one 
of those inbuilt possibilities that should 
be disregarded by me as the parties have 
chosen to disregard it in their prior sub-
missions. And perhaps it commends, as 
I endeavored to suggest in exploring the 
possibilities of some practical adjustment 
at the last hearing, further thoughts and 
efforts toward a practical solution be-
tween the parties. 
The foregoing opinion, together with 
the recitation of uncontroverted facts set 
out in the pre-trial order submitted M 
the parties, is deemed sufficient as AMI 
ings of fact and conclusions of law. fa 
view of the situation last mentioned, honk 
ever, it is directed that a form of pra 
posed decree not inconsistent with thif 
opinion be prepared by counsel for the; 
Government, and, if the form is not 
agreed to by the parties, settled upon at 
least five days notice on one of my regr*-
lar rule days. 
